Case 2026-02-26 12:03:45

Findings
None – no autorun entries in the Run/RunOnce keys show suspicious paths, LOLBins, encoded arguments, or known malicious binaries.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – the two Run/RunOnce entries are SecurityHealthSystray.exe (row 1) and VBoxTray.exe (row 2); no reference to redpetya.exe appears.
• psexec → Not Observed – neither row contains a command line invoking psexec.exe or any PsExec‑related arguments.

Data Gaps

• The artifact covers only a single timestamp (2023‑09‑24 14:57:27 UTC) and includes just two autorun values, providing an extremely limited view of persistence mechanisms.
• No username fields are populated, so it is impossible to determine whether the entries were created under a privileged or user context.
• No other Run/RunOnce locations (HKLM vs. HKCU sub‑keys), scheduled tasks, services, or startup folders are present; absence of these could hide additional persistence.
• No evidence of redpetya.exe or PsExec usage elsewhere (e.g., process creation logs, SMB session logs) – those artifacts are required to confirm lateral movement or execution.
• Lack of timestamps before/after the observed date prevents building a timeline of when (or if) malicious entries might have been added or later removed.

Additional artifacts to examine: full Registry hive (including all Run/RunOnce sub‑keys), Sysmon event logs (process creation, network connections), SMB/Remote Service logs for PsExec activity, and file system metadata for the redpetya.exe binary.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] A new scheduled task Enterpries backup was created on 2024‑02‑06 21:49:21.961830 UTC (row 4) under the local admin account (user_id admin) with run level HighestAvailable.
• Evidence: task_path C:\Windows\system32\tasks\Enterpries backup; date 2024-02-06T21:49:21.961830+00:00; user_id admin; display_name Enterpries backup; run_level HighestAvailable (row 4).
• Why it matters: The task resides outside the default Microsoft namespace, runs with elevated privileges, and was created just days before the ransomware incident – a classic persistence/lateral‑movement vector.
• Alternative explanation: Could be a legitimate admin‑created backup job, but the name is miss‑spelled and the timing is suspicious.
• Verify: Correlate with Windows Event Logs (TaskScheduler/Operational) for the creation event and check the task XML for any additional payload paths.

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] The Enterpries backup task invokes PsExec.exe from a user‑downloaded location and passes a command that copies/executess rename.exe from the admin’s Desktop with clear‑text credentials (-u admin -p letmein).
• Evidence: arguments "-accept-eula \\Desktop-001,Desktop-002,Desktop-003,Desktop-004,Desktop-005,Desktop-006 -c -d -u admin -p letmein -realtime C:\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe" and command C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe (row 5).
• Why it matters: PsExec is a known lateral‑movement tool; the use of hard‑coded credentials and a user‑land executable (rename.exe) strongly indicates malicious activity, possibly the deployment of ransomware components.
• Alternative explanation: An admin may have been using PsExec for a legitimate bulk rename operation, but the inclusion of multiple remote desktops and the “realtime” flag are atypical for benign admin tasks.
• Verify: Locate rename.exe on the filesystem, hash it, and compare against known Red Petya payloads; review network logs for outbound SMB connections to the listed desktops.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] A CreateExplorerShellUnelevatedTask references C:\Windows\explorer.exe with the argument /NoUACCheck.
• Evidence: Row 2 shows command C:\Windows\explorer.exe and arguments /NoUACCheck.
• Why it matters: Disabling UAC checks can be abused to run code with reduced prompts, a technique sometimes leveraged by ransomware to hide its execution.
• Alternative explanation: May be a legitimate customization for a specific user environment.
• Verify: Check the task’s trigger and creator; look for any associated scripts or binaries launched by this task.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – No scheduled‑task entry references this filename or path.
• PsExec → Observed – Appears as the command for the Enterpries backup task (row 5).

Data Gaps

1. Timeline coverage ends on 2024‑02‑06 – The ransomware screen appeared on 2024‑02‑12, but the task list contains no entries after Feb 6. Any tasks created between Feb 7‑12 (or later) are absent, limiting visibility into the final compromise steps.
2. Missing trigger details – The CSV does not include the task trigger (e.g., at logon, on boot, or one‑time). Without this we cannot confirm whether the task executed automatically at the time of the incident.
3. No hash or size fields – The artifact does not provide hashes of the executable arguments (e.g., rename.exe), preventing direct malware identification.
4. No correlation with EVTX – Scheduled‑task creation events in the Windows Microsoft‑Windows‑TaskScheduler/Operational log are not supplied; correlating timestamps would strengthen attribution.
5. Potential log tampering – The _dedup_comment notes many deduplicated records, suggesting multiple identical entries may have been collapsed; if an adversary cleared or edited the task schedule, the original timestamps could be lost.

Additional artifacts that would aid the investigation: TaskScheduler EVTX logs, file system metadata for rename.exe and PsExec.exe (creation/modification times, hashes), network connection logs to the listed desktops, and any process creation events (Process Creation EVTX) for the PsExec execution.

Findings

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] No services referencing the ransomware binary redpetya.exe.
• Evidence: The imagepath column contains only system paths (e.g., %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe, C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\...) and never the filename redpetya.exe. No row mentions this name.
• Why it matters: A service that loads the ransomware executable would be a strong persistence indicator. Its absence suggests the ransomware did not achieve boot‑time persistence via a Windows service (or the service was created after the latest timestamp in the data).
• Alternative explanation: The malicious binary could have been launched directly (e.g., via psexec) without being registered as a service, or the service could have been created after 2024‑02‑07 (the latest record).
• Verify: Correlate with EVTX Event ID 7045 (Service installation) from the system‑event log covering 12 Feb 2024 onward to see if any new service entry appears.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] No evidence of a PsExec‑created service (psexesvc or similar).
• Evidence: The name column does not contain entries such as psexesvc, PsExecSvc, or any other unconventional service name. All listed services are known Windows or vendor components.
• Why it matters: PsExec often creates a temporary service to execute remote commands. Its presence would indicate lateral‑movement activity.
• Alternative explanation: PsExec may have been used with the -s flag to run directly without installing a service, or any PsExec‑related service was created after the last timestamp (2024‑02‑07 20:59).
• Verify: Search the System and Security Event logs for Event ID 7045 or 4688 entries showing psexesvc.exe execution around the incident window.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] No newly‑added auto‑start services during the observed window.
• Evidence: The start column shows 105 Auto‑Start entries, all of which correspond to standard Windows components (e.g., WinDefend, W32Time, WpnService). No service with a creation timestamp after 2023‑09‑24 (the bulk of the data) shows a start type of “Auto” that is atypical.
• Why it matters: New auto‑start services are a common persistence technique. Their absence reduces the likelihood of a lingering service‑based foothold.
• Alternative explanation: A malicious service could have been configured to start “Manual” and later launched on demand, or it could have been added after the data cutoff.
• Verify: Review the System Event log for Service Control Manager events (ID 7045) after 2024‑02‑07 to confirm whether any new services were added.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – No service entry references this filename.
• psexec / PsExec‑related service → Not Observed – No psexesvc or similar service name appears.

Data Gaps

1. Time coverage: The services artifact stops at 2024‑02‑07 20:59 UTC, whereas the ransomware screen was seen on 12 Feb 2024. Any services installed or modified between 07 Feb and 12 Feb (or later) are missing, preventing confirmation of post‑incident persistence mechanisms.
2. Missing Event ID 7045 records: The dataset does not include the Service Control Manager events that would explicitly log service creation (Event ID 7045). Without these, we cannot definitively state that no new services were installed.
3. No command‑line data: PsExec usage can be inferred from process creation logs (Event 4688) showing psexesvc.exe or psexec.exe. Those logs are not present, so lateral‑movement via PsExec cannot be ruled out.
4. No file‑system metadata: Confirmation that the redpetya.exe binary existed on the system (e.g., from an MSFT_FileName artifact) is absent, so we cannot verify whether it was ever placed on disk.

Recommended Next Steps

• Pull System and Security EVTX files for the window 08 Feb 2024 – 15 Feb 2024 and search for Event ID 7045 (service install) and 4688 (process creation) to capture any late‑stage service or PsExec activity.
• Query the Shellbags / Prefetch and FileSystem artifacts for the presence of redpetya.exe to confirm if the binary was ever written to disk.
• Examine Network logs for SMB traffic to/from the server around 12 Feb 2024, which may indicate PsExec‑style remote execution.

Conclusion: Within the provided services data (up to 07 Feb 2024), there is no concrete evidence of malicious services, the ransomware binary, or PsExec‑related service creation. The lack of coverage for the CRITICAL post‑incident period is the primary limitation. Further log collection covering the incident dates is required for a definitive assessment.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe (FileName) → Not Assessable – the WMI Persistence artifact contains no records to indicate the presence or absence of this file.
• psexec (SuspiciousTools) → Not Assessable – no WMI event subscription data is available to show execution or use of PsExec.

Data Gaps

• The supplied WMI Persistence artifact contains zero records (“No columns available.”), providing no timestamps, event filter definitions, consumer commands, or binding identifiers.
• Consequently, we cannot determine whether any WMI‐based persistence mechanisms (EventFilters, EventConsumers, or FilterToConsumerBindings) exist, nor can we correlate such mechanisms with process creation logs, Prefetch, or ShimCache entries.
• The absence of data may reflect a collection issue (e.g., failed export, corrupted repository) or that the target system simply has no WMI persistence objects, but the artifact as provided is insufficient for any forensic assessment.
• To resolve this, acquire a complete WMI repository dump (e.g., using wmic /namespace:\\root\subscription path __eventfilter list /format:csv, eventconsumer, and __filtertoconsumerbinding), and correlate with system logs (EVTX, Prefetch, ShimCache) and network traffic to evaluate the suspected PsExec activity and the redpetya.exe payload.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Evidence of PsExec lateral‑movement activity.
• Evidence:
• Row 8 – 2024‑02‑05T23:25:15.663250+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\PSEXESVC.exe (PsExec service executable on a remote admin share).
• Row 120 – 2024‑02‑05T23:14:39.491949+00:00 – C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe (local copy of PsExec).
• Row 122 – 2024‑02‑05T23:14:39.522984+00:00 – C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec64.exe.
• Why it matters: PsExec is a known tool for executing commands remotely and is frequently abused for lateral movement and privilege escalation in ransomware campaigns. The presence of both the service binary on a network share and the client binary in the user’s download folder strongly suggests active use.
• Alternative explanation: An administrator may have placed PsExec on the host for legitimate remote management; however, combined with the remote‑share copy (PSEXESVC) and the timing (Feb 2024, just before the ransomware event) this is more consistent with attacker activity.
• Verify: Correlate these entries with Windows Event Logs (Process Creation – 4688, PowerShell – 4104) and network logs for SMB connections to 10.44.24.9 around the same timestamps; also check Prefetch/Amcache for execution artifacts.

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Large number of Sysinternals utilities on the host, indicating possible credential‑access and enumeration actions.
• Evidence: Multiple rows on 2024‑02‑05 showing copies of Sysinternals tools in C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\ such as: pslist.exe, pslist64.exe, pskill.exe, pskill64.exe, PsInfo.exe, PsInfo64.exe, pspasswd.exe, pspasswd64.exe, psloglist.exe, psloglist64.exe, PsLoggedon.exe, PsLoggedon64.exe, procmon.exe, procmon64.exe, procdump.exe, procdump64.exe, ADExplorer.exe, ADExplorer64.exe, Autoruns.exe, Autoruns64.exe, Bginfo.exe, Bginfo64.exe, etc. (rows 31‑58, 59‑68, 70‑84, 90‑114, 119‑138, 140‑154).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals tools are routinely used by attackers for process enumeration (pslist, psinfo), credential enumeration (PsLoggedon, PsGetSid), and dumping memory (procdump). Their presence in a user’s temp/download directory shortly before the ransomware incident suggests they were staged for post‑compromise activity.
• Alternative explanation: An administrator or user may have downloaded the Sysinternals Suite for legitimate troubleshooting. Without corroborating execution evidence, the intent cannot be definitively proven.
• Verify: Search for corresponding execution records in Prefetch, Amcache, or Sysmon (Event 1) and check for creation of scheduled tasks or services that reference these binaries.

• **[SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Remote UNC path entries to \\10.44.24.9\admin$ indicating possible file staging or remote execution.**
• Evidence:
• Row 3 – 2019‑12‑06T21:29:00+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\write.exe.
• Row 4 – 2019‑12‑07T09:10:00.444992+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\winhlp32.exe.
• Row 5 – 2023‑11‑16T12:11:09.408899+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\regedit.exe.
• Row 6 – 2023‑11‑16T12:03:42.085066+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\splwow64.exe.
• Row 7 – 2023‑11‑16T12:13:19.602324+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\notepad.exe.
• Row 9 – 2019‑12‑07T09:09:39.615219+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\hh.exe.
• Row 10 – 2024‑01‑09T22:58:00.092497+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\HelpPane.exe.
• Row 11 – 2024‑01‑09T22:57:19.264709+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\explorer.exe.
• Row 12 – 2023‑11‑16T12:03:29.749149+00:00 – \\10.44.24.9\admin$\bfsvc.exe.
• Why it matters: The repeated presence of standard system binaries accessed via a UNC path to an administrator share suggests an attacker may have copied tools to the remote host for later execution (common in post‑exploitation). Coupled with the PsExec entries, this pattern points to lateral movement using SMB.
• Alternative explanation: These entries could result from legitimate remote administration (e.g., a sysadmin using SMB to run tools remotely). Lack of execution proof leaves some uncertainty.
• Verify: Review SMB session logs, 445 TCP traffic, and Windows Security logs for successful authentication from the source IP (10.44.24.9). Look for created services or scheduled tasks referencing these UNC paths.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Massive proliferation of dismhost.exe copies in temporary folders (e.g., rows 1‑2, 13‑14, 31‑...‑514).**
• Evidence: Over 150 entries of dismhost.exe located in various %TEMP% sub‑folders dated 2021‑05‑08 (e.g., C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\0498F23C-...dismhost.exe).
• Why it matters: While dismhost.exe is a legitimate Windows component, the sheer number of temporary copies may indicate a tool or script that extracts or stages files (potentially used to hide malicious payloads). However, the timestamps are from 2021, well before the incident, and no recent copies appear.
• Alternative explanation: These are leftover artifacts from a legitimate Windows Update or system maintenance routine long ago.
• Verify: Check for any corresponding entries in Prefetch/Amcache for execution and inspect the file hashes if possible to determine if they have been tampered.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – No redpetya.exe path appears in the shimcache data.
• psexec → Observed – PSEXESVC.exe (row 8) and PsExec.exe / PsExec64.exe (rows 120, 122) are present.

Data Gaps

• The shimcache only records file path and last‑modified timestamps; it does not confirm execution. Corroborating evidence (Prefetch, Amcache, EVTX 4688, Sysmon 1) is required to prove the binaries actually ran.
• The timestamp range ends at 2024‑02‑07 10:22 UTC, just after the ransomware display (12 Feb 2024). Any activity on 12 Feb 2024 itself may be missing if logs were cleared or not captured.
• No hash or size information is available, limiting verification of whether the observed binaries are the legitimate versions or have been tampered.
• Network logs (SMB connections, DNS queries) are absent, preventing confirmation of the remote share interactions with 10.44.24.9.
• No evidence of scheduled tasks, services, or registry persistence mechanisms is available in this artifact; additional artifacts (Task Scheduler, Registry, WMI) should be examined.
• The large number of dismhost.exe entries are old (2021) and may be unrelated, but without file metadata they cannot be definitively ruled out.

Next steps: Correlate these shimcache entries with process creation logs, network traffic, and other persistence artifacts to verify actual execution and assess the extent of lateral movement and credential‑access activity.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Execution of Sysinternals PsExec tools from a user’s Downloads folder shortly before the ransomware event.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T22:14:12.373672+00:00 – c:\users\admin\downloads\sysinternalssuite\psexec.exe – publisher “sysinternals – www.sysinternals.com” – row 71.
• 2024-02-07T21:00:11.248564+00:00 – c:\users\administrator\downloads\sysinternalssuite\psexec64.exe – publisher “sysinternals – www.sysinternals.com” – row 72.
• 2024-02-06T22:14:14.995445+00:00 – c:\users\admin\downloads\sysinternalssuite\psexec64.exe – publisher “sysinternals – www.sysinternals.com” – row 73.
• Why it matters: PsExec is a well‑known remote execution tool used by attackers for lateral movement and to launch payloads such as ransomware. Its presence on user download locations (rather than the standard Sysinternals store) and the timing (within days of the Feb 12 Red Petya screen) align with the suspicion of PsExec misuse.
• Alternative explanation: Sysinternals tools are legitimate and may have been downloaded for legitimate administration. However, their location in a user’s Downloads directory and lack of accompanying system‑wide installation hint at ad‑hoc use.
• Verify: Correlate these file records with Windows Event Logs, PowerShell logs, and Network traces for PsExec service creation or remote SMB connections around 2024‑02‑06 to 2024‑02‑09.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Presence of unknown executables with no publisher metadata in user‑level folders.
• Evidence:
• 2023-09-24T21:08:17.211145+00:00 – c:\windows\system32\aggregatorhost.exe – publisher blank – row 1.
• 2024-02-07T21:00:10.342958+00:00 – c:\users\admin\desktop\dir.exe – publisher blank – row 13.
• 2024-02-07T21:00:10.562542+00:00 – c:\users\admin\desktop\rename.exe – publisher blank – row 80.
• Why it matters: Executables lacking publisher information and residing outside typical system directories are often indicative of custom or malicious tools. Their appearance close to the incident window (Feb 07) could suggest staging or execution of payloads.
• Alternative explanation: These could be benign utilities placed by IT staff or users (e.g., a custom script named dir.exe). Without hash or further context, the intent is unclear.
• Verify: Compute SHA‑1 hashes of the files and submit them to threat‑intel platforms; examine last‑access timestamps, creation/modification times, and related command‑line logs (e.g., Prefetch/ShimCache).

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Installation of network‑reconnaissance utilities (Nmap, Zenmap, Npcap).
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T21:01:08.309662+00:00 – c:\program files (x86)\nmap\ncat.exe – publisher blank – row 59.
• 2024-02-06T21:01:08.326410+00:00 – c:\program files (x86)\nmap\ndiff.exe – publisher blank – product “zenmap” – row 60.
• 2024-02-07T21:00:11.233940+00:00 – c:\users\admin\downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe – publisher “insecure.org” – product “nmap” – row 62.
• 2024-02-06T21:01:08.124117+00:00 – c:\program files\npcap\npcap.sys – publisher “insecure.com llc.” – product “npcap” – row 67.
• Why it matters: Nmap is frequently used by attackers for internal network mapping before lateral movement. Its appearance shortly before the ransomware event could indicate reconnaissance.
• Alternative explanation: Nmap is also a common legitimate security‑testing tool; the presence alone does not prove malicious intent.
• Verify: Look for corresponding command‑line usage in Prefetch or Event Logs; check for network scans in firewall or IDS logs around the same dates.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] No evidence of the Red Petya binary (redpetya.exe) in the Amcache inventory.**
• Evidence: The full Amcache record list (rows 1‑539) contains no entry where path ends with redpetya.exe.
• Why it matters: Absence suggests the ransomware binary was either executed from a location not captured by Amcache, deleted before the snapshot, or delivered via in‑memory execution.
• Alternative explanation: The ransomware may have been run from a removable drive or remote share not recorded in Amcache.
• Verify: Search other artifacts (ShimCache, Prefetch, $MFT, or memory dumps) for redpetya.exe or its hash.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe (FileName) → Not Observed – No matching path entry in Amcache.
• psexec (SuspiciousTool) → Observed – See rows 71‑73 (Sysinternals PsExec binaries in user download folders).

Data Gaps

1. Time coverage ends 2024‑02‑09 21:00:06, three days before the ransomware screen appeared (2024‑02‑12). Any activity after this cutoff is invisible in this artifact.
2. Missing SHA‑1 hashes for all entries; without hash values we cannot directly compare to threat‑intel databases or confirm file integrity.
3. No command‑line or process‑creation data (e.g., Prefetch, ShimCache) in this export, limiting the ability to confirm execution of the listed binaries.
4. Potential tampering: The deduplication comments indicate many duplicate records were collapsed; while not inherently suspicious, it reduces granularity that might reveal rapid re‑creation of files.
5. Other useful artifacts: ShimCache, Prefetch, Windows Event Logs (Security, Sysmon), network flow logs, and memory snapshots would help confirm the actual execution of PsExec, the unknown executables, and any lateral movement or ransomware payload deployment.

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All conclusions are drawn strictly from the provided Amcache data; no external information was fabricated.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Execution of PsExec tools from a user‑download directory.
• Evidence:
• 2024‑02‑06T22:14:12.975912+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec64.exe (row 13)
• 2024‑02‑09T22:55:44.556122+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe (row 23)
• Why it matters: PsExec is a known credential‑stealing and lateral‑movement tool; its execution from a user’s Downloads folder shortly before the ransomware display strongly suggests it was used to propagate or trigger the attack.
• Alternative explanation: An administrator may have been testing PsExec for legitimate remote administration; however the timing (days before the Red Petya event) and placement in a non‑system folder make malicious use more likely.
• Verify: Correlate with Windows Security logs (4624, 4648) and Sysmon Event 1/5 entries for the same timestamps to confirm the source account and remote targets.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Execution of network‑reconnaissance tools (Nmap suite).
• Evidence:
• 2024‑02‑05T23:43:02.682171+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe (row 15)
• 2024‑02‑08T19:06:34.806301+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\zenmap.exe (row 17)
• 2024‑02‑05T23:42:44.420574+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Npcap\NPFInstall.exe (row 16)
• Why it matters: Nmap components are frequently used by attackers for internal host discovery and port scanning prior to lateral movement; their presence indicates possible pre‑attack reconnaissance.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate security testing or IT staff installing the toolset.
• Verify: Review Event 1 (process creation) and network connection logs for outbound scans originating from the host at the same timestamps.

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Execution of generic system utilities often abused by ransomware (cmd.exe, rundll32.exe).
• Evidence:
• 2024‑02‑09T22:53:10.175224+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\cmd.exe (row 12)
• 2024‑02‑09T20:59:30.651415+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe (row 18)
• Why it matters: These binaries are routinely leveraged to launch payloads or execute scripts; their near‑simultaneous appearance on the night of Feb 9 may be part of the ransomware execution chain.
• Alternative explanation: Normal user or system task (e.g., script execution, maintenance).
• Verify: Examine command‑line arguments in Sysmon Event 1 or PowerShell logs to determine what commands were run.

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IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – No entry for this filename appears in the BAM/DAM records.
• PsExec (both PsExec.exe and PsExec64.exe) → Observed – See rows 13 and 23 (timestamps above).

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Data Gaps

• Time coverage: BAM/DAM data ends at 2024‑02‑09 22:55 UTC, three days before the ransomware screen was first seen (12 Feb 2024). Any execution activity on 12 Feb or later is absent.
• Missing fields: No user SID, process command‑line, parent‑process ID, or network‑connection data are captured, limiting attribution and impact assessment.
• Potential log tampering: The _dedup_comment indicates many duplicate events were collapsed; while expected for BAM, it obscures the exact count of executions, which could hide burst activity.
• Other artifacts needed:
• Sysmon (Event 1/5/6) logs for full process‑creation trees and command‑line arguments.
• Security Event Log (4624/4648) to see authentication events tied to PsExec usage.
• Prefetch/Amcache to verify whether redpetya.exe was ever executed on this host.
• Network traffic captures (e.g., Zeek, NetEvent) for evidence of lateral movement or exfiltration after the PsExec timestamps.

These gaps mean the current BAM/DAM view provides strong indication of tool execution but cannot conclusively map the full attack timeline or confirm the presence of the ransomware binary on this particular server.

Findings

• **[SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Execution of PsExec binaries from the Administrator’s user profile.
• Evidence:
• Row 27 – C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe, 1 execution, 2024‑02‑06T22:14:10.115000Z, user admin.
• Row 14 – C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec64.exe, 1 execution, 2024‑02‑06T22:14:12.356998Z, user admin.
• Why it matters: PsExec is a well‑known LOLBin used for remote code execution and lateral movement; its launch via Explorer indicates interactive use that could have been leveraged to spread the ransomware.
• Alternative explanation: An administrator may have been performing legitimate remote‑execution testing or maintenance.
• Verify: Correlate with Windows Security Event logs (4624, 4688) and Sysmon for network connections originated from the PsExec processes; check for remote service creation or SMB connections at the same timestamps.

• **[SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Frequent interactive use of cmd.exe.
• Evidence: Row 13 – {1AC14E77-02E7-4E5D-B744-2EB1AE5198B7}\cmd.exe, 7 executions, 2024‑02‑09T22:53:05.400000Z, user admin.
• Why it matters: HIGH count of command‑prompt launches shortly before the ransomware display suggests possible manual command‑line activity (e.g., script execution, privilege escalation).
• Alternative explanation: Routine administrative tasks using the command prompt.
• Verify: Review command‑line logging (Event 4688, Sysmon 1) for the specific cmd.exe processes to identify supplied arguments and any subsequent file writes or network activity.

• **[SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Execution of Nmap/Zenmap GUI.
• Evidence: Row 19 – {7C5A40EF-A0FB-4BFC-874A-C0F2E0B9FA8E}\Nmap\zenmap.exe, 2 executions, 2024‑02‑06T21:09:13.195999Z, user admin.
• Why it matters: Network scanning tools are often used in the reconnaissance phase of an intrusion; the timing coincides with other suspicious activity.
• Alternative explanation: A legitimate network audit performed by an admin.
• Verify: Examine network logs for outbound scans from the host at the same times; check if Nmap was run with aggressive options.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] One‑off launch of psshutdown64.exe.
• Evidence: Row 12 – C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\3\Temp1_SysinternalsSuite.zip\psshutdown64.exe, 1 execution, 2024‑02‑05T23:14:20.084999Z, user admin.
• Why it matters: psshutdown can be used to reboot or shut down remote machines, a technique sometimes employed before ransomware encryption.
• Alternative explanation: Accidental or test execution of the utility.
• Verify: Look for corresponding system shutdown/reboot events (Event 1074, Sysmon 12) around the timestamp.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – The UserAssist artifact only records Explorer‑launched programs; no entry for redpetya.exe appears, so its presence cannot be confirmed via this data source.
• PsExec → Observed – Executed twice (PsExec.exe and PsExec64.exe) by user admin on 2024‑02‑06 (see rows 27 & 14).

Data Gaps

• Temporal coverage: The latest UserAssist entry is 2024‑02‑09 22:53 UTC; there is no data after the ransomware display (12 Feb 2024), leaving a gap for the CRITICAL compromise window.
• Scope limitation: UserAssist only logs programs launched through Explorer (GUI). It does not capture:
• Command‑line only executions (e.g., scheduled tasks, services, remote PowerShell).
• Execution by other accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, SERVICE) that may have run redpetya.exe.
• Network activity, file writes, or registry modifications associated with the observed launches.
• Missing fields: No command‑line arguments, parent‑process IDs, or hashes; these are needed to confirm whether the PsExec instances were used to launch the ransomware or other malicious payloads.
• Recommended additional artifacts:

1. Windows Security Event Log (4624, 4648, 4688) – to see logon sessions and process creation details.
2. Sysmon operational log – for full process trees, hashes, and network connections.
3. PowerShell transcription/Module logs – to detect hidden script execution.
4. **Windows Shortcut (.lnk) and Scheduled Task artifacts** – may contain execution of redpetya.exe outside Explorer.

These supplementary sources are required to determine the full extent of the compromise, confirm lateral movement, and locate the redpetya.exe binary.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Deletion of a Sysinternals utilities archive shortly before the ransomware incident.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:14:49.615999+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite.zip, 50.6 MB, admin (row 2).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals tools (e.g., PsExec, ProcDump, AccessChk) are frequently used for credential dumping, lateral movement, and post‑compromise activity; removing the archive from the system may indicate an attempt to hide tool usage after malicious actions.
• Alternative explanation: The administrator may have simply cleaned up a downloaded utilities package after legitimate use.
• Verify: Correlate this timestamp with Windows Event Logs (e.g., Process Creation events, Sysmon logs) and network logs for any PsExec or Sysinternals executable launches around 2024‑02‑05 – 2024‑02‑06.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Deletion of a large share.zip file from the desktop.**
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T22:14:44.067999+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Desktop\share.zip, 0.65 GB, admin (row 1).
• Why it matters: The size suggests it could contain data staged for exfiltration or a payload; its removal may be an attempt to erase evidence.
• Alternative explanation: The file could be a routine user archive (e.g., personal documents, software bundle) that the admin decided to discard.
• Verify: Examine prior file creation/modification events for share.zip and any associated file access or network transfer logs to determine its contents and purpose.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed. (No record of this filename appears in the Recycle Bin data.)
• psexec → Not Observed. (No explicit reference to PsExec executable or usage appears in the Recycle Bin data.)

Data Gaps

• The Recycle Bin artifact provides only deletion timestamps, paths, file sizes, and usernames. It lacks:
• The contents of the deleted ZIP archives, preventing determination of whether they held malicious payloads, credentials, or exfiltrated data.
• Creation/modification timestamps for the files, which would help place the deletions in the overall attack timeline.
• Process execution logs (e.g., Sysmon, Security Event ID 4688) that could confirm whether Sysinternals tools or PsExec were launched around the deletion times.
• Network activity logs that could show data transfer of the share.zip payload.
• Coverage of the CRITICAL window on 12 Feb 2024 when the ransomware displayed; the recycle‑bin timestamps end on 6 Feb, leaving a gap of six days with no evidence from this artifact.
• To strengthen the investigation, additional artifacts such as System/Event logs, PowerShell transcription logs, Sysmon event streams, Windows Defender alerts, and network flow records should be collected and correlated with the timestamps above.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] External FTP connection to an un‑trusted IP address.
• Evidence: 2024-02-07T16:57:31.964310+00:00, URL ftp://185.239.106.67/branchoffice.example.com/, browser iexplore, username admin (row 50).
• Why it matters: FTP to a public IP can be used for data exfiltration or to fetch additional payloads; the host 185.239.106.67 is not a known internal service.
• Alternative explanation: Could be a legitimate file transfer by an administrator; however the timing (just after the ransomware event) and lack of other internal FTP logs make malicious use plausible.
• Verify: Capture network traffic (PCAP) for the time window around 2024‑02‑07 and query external threat intel on 185.239.106.67 for known C2 or malicious activity.

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Download and local storage of Sysinternals Suite (includes PsExec).
• Evidence 1: 2024-02-05T23:13:17.260740+00:00, URL https://www.bing.com/search?q=download+sysinternals+suite…, title download sysinternals suite - Search, username admin (row 8).
• Evidence 2: 2024-02-05T23:13:27.154423+00:00, URL https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite, title Sysinternals Suite - Sysinternals \| Microsoft Learn, username admin (row 11).
• Evidence 3: 2024-02-05T23:13:45.314323+00:00, URL file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/SysinternalsSuite.zip, username admin (row 43).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals contains tools (PsExec, ProcDump, AccessChk) frequently leveraged for credential dumping and lateral movement; the presence of a local ZIP suggests the tools were staged on the compromised host.
• Alternative explanation: Administrator may have legitimately downloaded Sysinternals for troubleshooting. The proximity to the ransomware event raises suspicion.
• Verify: Examine file system for the presence of the downloaded ZIP, hash it, and compare against known malicious variants; review process creation logs for psexec.exe or other Sysinternals utilities executed after 2024‑02‑05.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Use of Nmap download pages – possible network reconnaissance.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:40:22.322380+00:00, URL https://www.bing.com/search?...download+nmap…, title download nmap - Search, username admin (row 12). Follow‑up URLs to Softonic download pages (rows 17‑20).
• Why it matters: Nmap is a network scanning tool; downloading it shortly before the ransomware incident could indicate pre‑attack reconnaissance.
• Alternative explanation: Admin testing network tools; no execution evidence in this artifact.
• Verify: Check for nmap.exe binaries on disk and correlate with any subsequent network scan logs (e.g., Windows Firewall, IDS alerts).

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Local access to potentially sensitive scripts and credential files.
• Evidence: Multiple file:/// entries on 2024‑02‑05/07 for C:/scripts/activeDirectory_user_import.csv (row 45), C:/share/Clark.Nicholson/Documents/account_password.xlsx (row 46), C:/share/Clark.Nicholson/Documents/account_edit.docx (row 47), and C:/Users/admin/Desktop/RyukReadMe.txt (row 48).
• Why it matters: Access to AD import scripts and password spreadsheets may indicate preparation for credential harvesting or lateral movement.
• Alternative explanation: Routine administrative work; no indication of exfiltration in this artifact.
• Verify: Audit file timestamps, ACLs, and look for copies of these files elsewhere (e.g., network shares, external uploads).

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Repeated visits to Microsoft Edge welcome pages.
• Evidence: Numerous rows from 2023‑11‑04 to 2024‑02‑05 showing URLs like https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/... and Welcome to Microsoft Edge (rows 1‑7, 23‑31, etc.).
• Why it matters: Likely benign browser onboarding; no direct link to the incident.
• Alternative explanation: Normal user activity.
• Verify: Not needed for incident response.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no record of this filename in the browser history).
• psexec → Not Observed (no URL or file reference to psexec.exe; however, Sysinternals Suite download is observed, which contains PsExec).

Data Gaps

• Missing execution logs: No records of processes launched (e.g., psexec.exe, redpetya.exe, nmap.exe). Without Sysmon or Windows Event logs, we cannot confirm tool execution.
• Limited network data: Only FTP URLs are visible; full network traffic capture is needed to see whether the FTP session succeeded or if other C2 channels were used.
• File system artefacts absent: The browser history does not contain hashes or existence checks for the downloaded ZIPs; a file‑system scan would reveal whether the binaries are present and their timestamps.
• No timestamps after 2024‑02‑07: The artifact ends shortly after the ransomware display was observed; later activity (post‑infection) cannot be assessed here.
• User context ambiguity: Both admin and Administrator accounts appear; privilege levels and session separation are unclear.

Further artefacts to request: Sysmon/event logs, Windows Prefetch, MFT entries for the downloaded files, network PCAPs covering 2024‑02‑05 – 2024‑02‑12, and any Windows Security logs indicating credential dumping or lateral movement.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Download of Sysinternals Suite (potential source of PsExec).
• Evidence: row_ref 1 – 2024‑02‑05T23:13:32.211950 Z → C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite.zip from https://download.sysinternals.com/files/SysinternalsSuite.zip (state = complete, browser = edge, user = admin). Also row_ref 3 – 2023‑11‑04T15:25:24.686308 Z → C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite.zip from the same URL (complete, user = Administrator).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals Suite contains PsExec, a tool explicitly mentioned as a suspicious indicator and commonly used for lateral movement and privilege escalation in ransomware campaigns. The presence of a recent download (Feb 5, 2024) a week before the ransomware display suggests possible preparation for the attack.
• Alternative explanation: Sysinternals tools are frequently used by legitimate administrators for troubleshooting; the download could be a routine maintenance activity.
• Verify: Search the Prefetch, AmCache, or Windows Event Logs for execution of any executable within the downloaded Sysinternals Suite (e.g., psexec.exe) on the same host.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Download of Nmap installer.
• Evidence: row_ref 2 – 2024‑02‑05T23:41:28.640888 Z → C:\Users\admin\Downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe from https://gsf-fl.softonic.com/.../nmap-7.93-setup.exe?... (state = complete, browser = edge, user = admin).
• Why it matters: Nmap is a network discovery/scanning tool that can be employed by attackers to map internal hosts prior to lateral movement. Its download shortly before the ransomware incident may indicate reconnaissance activity.
• Alternative explanation: Nmap is a legitimate security utility; the download may reflect routine security testing by an admin.
• Verify: Check for execution of nmap-7.93-setup.exe and subsequent nmap.exe processes, plus any command‑line arguments indicating host scanning, in process creation logs or Sysmon event streams.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – No download entry for redpetya.exe appears in the browser‑downloads artifact.
• psexec → Not Observed as a named file, but Indirectly indicated by the Sysinternals Suite download (see Finding 1).

Data Gaps

• The artifact only shows download events; there are no execution logs (Prefetch, AmCache, Sysmon, or Event ID 4688) to confirm whether the downloaded Sysinternals Suite or Nmap were actually run.
• No timestamps after 2024‑02‑05 are present, leaving a gap of one week (Feb 6‑12) during which the ransomware became visible. Activity in that window cannot be assessed from this source.
• Missing fields such as file hash (SHA‑256) prevent verification of the exact binaries (e.g., to rule out tampered or maliciously repackaged tools).
• No evidence of PsExec execution, credential‑dumping tools, or redpetya.exe download/execution; correlating with other artifacts (process creation, network connections, SMB logs) would be required to confirm lateral movement or ransomware deployment.

Recommended next steps

1. Query Windows Event Logs, Prefetch, AmCache, and Sysmon for any execution of psexec.exe, nmap.exe, or files extracted from the Sysinternals ZIP between 2024‑02‑05 and 2024‑02‑12.
2. Collect file hash values of the downloaded archives from the filesystem and compare against known good Microsoft/Softonic hashes.
3. Review SMB/PowerShell remote execution logs for evidence of PsExec or other remote service usage.
4. Expand the timeline with endpoint detection logs (e.g., Windows Defender ATP) to cover the missing week leading up to the ransomware display.

Findings
None – the Activities Cache artifact contains no records, so no suspicious behavior can be observed.

IOC Status

• FileName – redpetya.exe → Not Assessable – the artifact has no entries to indicate execution or access of this file.
• SuspiciousTool – psexec → Not Assessable – no activity records are present that could show usage of PsExec.

Data Gaps

• The Activities Cache database is empty (Record count: 0, Time range: N/A to N/A). Consequently, there are no timestamps, application names, document paths, or URLs to analyze.
• Absence of any timeline data prevents verification of user activity before, during, or after the ransomware event, including potential use of remote‑execution tools, privilege‑escalation utilities, or access to sensitive files.
• No evidence of log clearing or tampering can be assessed from this artifact because the source itself provides no entries.

Recommended Next Steps

• Acquire additional artefacts that capture process creation (e.g., Sysmon, Windows Event Logs), command‑line usage, or network connections to confirm or refute the use of PsExec and execution of redpetya.exe.
• Examine registry Run/RunOnce keys, scheduled tasks, and Services registry for persistence mechanisms associated with Red Petya.
• Collect credential‑access artefacts (e.g., LSASS dumps, Mimikatz logs) and file‑system audit logs to assess privilege‑escalation and lateral‑movement activity.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable. No SRUM network records to indicate activity from this binary.
• psexec → Not Assessable. SRUM network data contains no entries to evaluate usage of PsExec or any related process.

Data Gaps

• The SRUM Network Data artifact contains zero records (Record count: 0) and no timestamps, application names, or byte counts, rendering any analysis of network activity impossible.
• Absence of time ranges prevents correlation with the reported incident on 12 Feb 2024.
• Without per‑application network usage, we cannot verify lateral‑movement tools (e.g., PsExec), ransomware execution (redpetya.exe), or any data exfiltration.
• No evidence of log clearing or intentional tampering is visible, but the complete lack of entries could itself indicate that the SRUM database was cleared, disabled, or the collection failed.

Recommended Follow‑up

• Acquire additional artifacts: Windows Event Logs (Security, PowerShell, Sysmon), Prefetch, MRU, and the SRUM “App” and “Connection” tables, as well as any firewall or network flow logs that cover the timeframe around 12 Feb 2024.
• Verify SRUM service status and collection settings on the host to ensure it was enabled during the incident period.
• Examine the host for remnants of PsExec usage (e.g., scheduled tasks, service creation, SMB temporary files) and the redpetya.exe binary (hashes, file timestamps, execution records) using other forensic sources.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Execution of network‑reconnaissance tools (Nmap).
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T00:06:00+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\nmap.exe (SID S‑1‑5‑21‑1057484085‑1795310446‑2370380301‑2611) – foreground cycle time = 221 269 249 429 cycles.

2024-02-06T00:06:00+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\zenmap.exe (same SID) – foreground cycle time = 227 183 733 421 cycles.

• Why it matters: Nmap is a common post‑compromise scanning tool; its execution under an administrative SID suggests an adversary was mapping the network after gaining privileged access.
• Alternative explanation: An authorized administrator could have been performing legitimate network testing. The large cycle times are consistent with a long‑running scan, but the presence of the tool on a server that previously displayed ransomware is unusual.
• Verify: Correlate with other logs (e.g., Windows Firewall, PowerShell transcript, network flow logs) to confirm whether Nmap was invoked intentionally or maliciously and identify any hosts it probed.

• **[SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Repeated execution of DismHost.exe from transient Temp directories.**
• Evidence: Multiple rows (e.g., 2023-12-13T09:13:00+00:00 – ...\Temp\20E089F8-EEF8-44B1-BBEC-E61F1584B677\DismHost.exe SID S‑1‑5‑18, foreground cycle time = 5 407 258 740; 2023-12-14T20:18:00+00:00 – ...\Temp\F454C235-AF12-47F8-9364-F55374E33E80\DismHost.exe foreground cycle time = 2 794 428 053; etc., spanning the whole investigation window).
• Why it matters: DismHost.exe is a legitimate DISM component, but its frequent launch from random %TEMP% paths is a known “Living‑off‑the‑Land” technique used to evade detection and execute code with elevated privileges.
• Alternative explanation: Some automated maintenance or imaging scripts may invoke DISM from temporary locations; however, the sheer volume and the varied GUID‑named folders are atypical for routine updates.
• Verify: Examine the command‑line arguments for each DismHost.exe instance (via Process Creation logs or Sysmon) and check the associated payload files for signs of malicious modules or scripts.

• **[SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Presence of a user‑level rename.exe on the desktop.**
• Evidence: 2024-02-09T22:56:00+00:00 – \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe (SID S‑1‑5‑21‑1057484085‑1795310446‑2370380301‑2611) – foreground cycle time = 13 284 139 184 cycles.
• Why it matters: Unknown utility on the desktop could be a custom tool used by an attacker to rename or manipulate files (e.g., ransomware payload).
• Alternative explanation: The file may be a benign third‑party utility installed by an administrator. No other corroborating evidence (e.g., hash, execution context) is present.
• Verify: Hash the binary, compare against known software catalogs, and check for any associated scheduled tasks or registry Run keys.

• [SEVERITY: NONE] No evidence of the primary IOCs.
• The SRUM data contains no records for redpetya.exe or psexec.exe.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no matching app value in the SRUM records).
• psexec → Not Observed (no matching app value).

Data Gaps

• Timeline coverage: The SRUM records end at 2024‑02‑09 22:56 UTC, two days before the ransomware incident reported on 12 Feb 2024. Consequently, any malicious activity that triggered the “Red Petya” display (including execution of redpetya.exe or PsExec lateral movement) is outside the observable window.
• Missing fields: The SRUM export provides only foreground_cycle_time (CPU cycles spent in the foreground). It lacks explicit process command‑line arguments, hashes, network connections, or parent‑process IDs, limiting the ability to confirm “living‑off‑the‑land” misuse of DismHost.exe or to associate the Nmap executions with a specific attacker command.
• Potential log tampering: The _dedup_comment column shows extensive deduplication (e.g., “Deduplicated 1346 records”). While deduplication is a normal export optimization, it obscures the raw event count and may hide spikes in activity that could be indicative of an attack.
• Additional artifacts needed:

1. Process Creation logs ( Sysmon Event 4688 / 4689 ) for full command‑line capture of DismHost.exe, rename.exe, and the Nmap binaries.
2. Network session logs (Windows Filtering Platform, NetFlow, or PCAP) to see if the Nmap tools actually scanned internal hosts.
3. Security Event Log (Event 7045 – Service Installation, Event 4624 – Logons) around the 12‑Feb window to catch PsExec usage or new services.
4. **File‑system metadata (hashes, timestamps) for the rename.exe and any redpetya.exe binaries** that may reside elsewhere on the disk.

*Given the lack of direct evidence for the ransomware binary and PsExec, the most actionable leads are the Nmap scans and the anomalous DismHost.exe launches, which should be pursued with the supplemental logs above.*

Findings

• [SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Remote administrative‑share enumeration across multiple hosts.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-08T08:39:20+00:00 – accessed Network\<USERS_PROPERTY_VIEW {999534523}>\10.44.24.8\c$\Users (row 4).
• 2024-02-08T08:22:12+00:00 – accessed Network\<USERS_PROPERTY_VIEW {999534523}>\10.44.24.1\c$\Users (row 17).
• 2024-02-08T08:16:56+00:00 – accessed Network\<USERS_PROPERTY_VIEW {999534523}>\10.44.24.6\c$\Users (row 22).
• 2024-02-08T08:29:48+00:00 – accessed Network\<USERS_PROPERTY_VIEW {999534523}>\10.44.24.7\c$\Users (row 27).
• 2024-02-08T08:33:14+00:00 – accessed Network\<USERS_PROPERTY_VIEW {999534523}>\10.44.24.9\c$\Users (row 32).
• 2023-09-24T20:02:32+00:00 – accessed Network\<USERS_PROPERTY_VIEW {999534523}>\WIN‑NI9FBK23SLO.branchoffice.example.com\home$\Jorden.Davidson (row 40).
• Why it matters: Enumerating the default administrative shares (c$) on several internal IPs is a classic step in lateral‑movement attacks, often performed with tools such as PsExec. The timestamps (early February 2024) are immediately after the Red Petya outbreak, suggesting post‑infection credential use.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate administrators could be browsing shared user profiles for routine maintenance. However, the breadth (five distinct hosts) and concentration of activity within a single day are atypical for routine work.
• Verify: Pull Windows Security Event logs (4624/4625) for the same timestamps to confirm use of credentialed remote execution (e.g., PsExec, SMB Session) from the source account (admin).

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Presence of Sysinternals tooling and a suspicious archive on the desktop.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-05T23:13:42+00:00 – My Computer\{088e3905‑0323‑4b02‑9826‑5d99428e115f}\SysinternalsSuite.zip (row 60).
• 2024-02-07T04:04:00+00:00 – My Computer\Desktop\important.zip (row 63).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals tools are frequently used for privilege escalation, credential dumping, and lateral movement. The “important.zip” may be a staging archive for exfiltration or for bundling malicious payloads (e.g., Red Petya).
• Alternative explanation: An administrator could have legitimately downloaded Sysinternals for troubleshooting and later placed a personal archive on the desktop. The lack of accompanying execution events leaves intent uncertain.
• Verify: Search the Prefetch, AmCache, and Event Log (4688) for executions of psexec.exe, procmon.exe, procdump.exe, or any process that extracts the zip contents.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Extensive browsing of user profile folders on remote hosts.
• Evidence: Multiple rows (e.g., rows 5‑14, 18‑19, 23‑24, 28‑29, 33‑34) show access to c$\Users\<username> and their Documents folders across hosts 10.44.24.8, .1, .6, .7, .9 during 2023‑2024.
• Why it matters: Indicates collection of user data (documents) that could be staged for exfiltration or searched for credentials.
• Alternative explanation: Routine admin audit of user folders. The repeated pattern across many accounts may still be benign.
• Verify: Correlate with file‑creation/deletion (USN/Journal) events for copied files and with network traffic logs for outbound data transfers.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – No entry with that filename appears in the Shellbag data.
• psexec → Not Observed – No explicit psexec.exe or related execution record is present; however, the remote admin‑share activity is consistent with PsExec usage.

Data Gaps

• Missing atime/ctime: The ts_atime and ts_btime columns are empty, limiting ability to differentiate first‑time access from later updates.
• No process execution records: Shellbags capture folder navigation only; they do not show which executables were run, so we cannot directly confirm execution of PsExec, Sysinternals tools, or redpetya.exe.
• No file‑level hashes or content: Without hash data we cannot verify whether important.zip or SysinternalsSuite.zip contain malicious payloads.
• Limited timeline coverage: The earliest entries are from mid‑2023; any earlier compromise activity (e.g., initial Red Petya infection) would not be reflected here.
• Potential log tampering: The presence of many deduplicated rows suggests some consolidation of identical events; however, no explicit evidence of log clearing is visible in this artifact.

Recommended next steps

1. Collect Windows Security, Sysmon, and PowerShell logs for the Feb 2024 window to identify credentialed remote executions (e.g., PsExec) and process creation of Sysinternals binaries.
2. **Extract and hash the SysinternalsSuite.zip and important.zip** to compare against known malicious signatures.
3. Query SMB session logs (e.g., Netlogon, NetShare) on the involved hosts (10.44.24.*) to confirm successful connections and potential credential reuse.
4. Review network flow captures for outbound traffic from the workstation to external IPs that could indicate exfiltration of the “important.zip” contents.

Findings
No suspicious entries are present in the MUICache data. All recorded FriendlyAppName / ApplicationCompany pairs correspond to legitimate Windows system components or Microsoft‑signed applications located in standard system directories (e.g., C:\Windows\system32, C:\Program Files). There are no entries for the file name redpetya.exe, nor any known lateral‑movement tools such as psexec.exe, and no anomalous executables in user‑writable locations.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed – no row references a path or description matching this filename.
• psexec → Not Observed – no entry references “psexec” or its typical executable name.

Data Gaps

• No timestamps: MUICache does not store execution times, so it cannot be correlated with the Feb 12 2024 incident or used to build a timeline.
• Limited scope: The artifact only records display strings (friendly name, company) for executables that have been launched; it provides no command‑line arguments, parent‑process information, or user context beyond the username field.
• Potentially missing evidence: If the malicious binary was executed from a non‑standard location (e.g., %TEMP%, user profile) and later deleted, it would still appear in MUICache if the display string was cached. No such entries are present, suggesting either the binary was never run on this host or the cache was cleared/tampered with.
• Corroboration needed: To confirm or refute compromise, additional artifacts (Prefetch, Amcache, Shimcache, process creation logs, PowerShell transcript logs, network connections, Sysmon events) should be examined. These can provide timestamps, execution paths, and evidence of credential‑access tools (e.g., Mimikatz) or lateral‑movement activity.

In summary, the MUICache artifact does not reveal any execution of the Red Petya ransomware binary or PsExec, and shows only normal Microsoft‑signed activity. Further forensic sources are required to determine whether the ransomware was present or executed on this system.

Nothing suspicious observed in the SAM Users artifact: only the default built‑in accounts (Administrator, Guest, DefaultAccount, WDAGUtilityAccount) are present, each with placeholder timestamps (1601‑01‑01) and no evidence of recent creation, privilege changes, or password modifications【row_ref=1-4】.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable (file artifact not present in SAM data).
• psexec → Not Assessable (process/tool artifact not present in SAM data).

Data Gaps

• Temporal coverage: The SAM snapshot is from 2023‑09‑24, more than four months before the February 12 2024 ransomware incident, so any account activity around the compromise window cannot be observed here.
• Missing fields: No account creation dates, modification timestamps, or explicit group‑membership data are available; only last‑login/password fields (all set to the sentinel value 1601‑01‑01) are present, limiting ability to detect newly created or altered privileged accounts.
• No evidence of tampering: The deduplication comment indicates records were de‑duplicated, but no gaps or missing rows are evident within this limited view.
• Correlative artifacts needed: To assess privileged‑access abuse or lateral‑movement tools (e.g., PsExec), consult Security Event logs (Event IDs 4720, 4722, 4732, 4624, 4648), process creation logs, and Registry autorun locations. These would provide creation/modification timestamps, group membership changes, and execution traces that the SAM file alone cannot reveal.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed. No quarantine entries reference this filename.
• psexec → Not Observed. No quarantine entries reference PsExec or related tool names.

Data Gaps

• The Defender Quarantine artifact contains zero records (Record count: 0), providing no timestamps, file paths, threat names, or detection contexts to analyze.
• Without any entries, we cannot assess whether any malicious files were detected, whether persistence locations were targeted, or if repeated quarantines occurred.
• The absence of data prevents verification of remediation success/failure, correlation with other logs (e.g., EVTX), or determination of any timeline of malicious activity.

Recommended next steps

• Acquire additional forensic sources (e.g., Windows Defender operational logs, EVTX files, Sysmon events, PowerShell transcript logs) that record detection and remediation actions.
• Collect Windows Registry hives, scheduled task definitions, and startup folder contents to investigate persistence mechanisms that may have been used by Red Petya or PsExec.
• Examine network connection logs and SMB session records to corroborate any lateral movement attempts.