Case 2026-02-18 19:27:17

Nothing suspicious is present in these Run/RunOnce entries; both autoruns point to expected Windows/VirtualBox components and do not reference the suspected IOCs.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: No name or command values contain redpetya.exe in rows 1–2 (timestamp 2023-09-24T14:57:27.211781+00:00).
• psexec → Not Observed
• Evidence: No name or command values contain psexec/psexesvc in rows 1–2 (timestamp 2023-09-24T14:57:27.211781+00:00).

Data Gaps

• Time coverage does not include the incident window (12 Feb 2024). This artifact only shows entries at 2023-09-24T14:57:27.211781+00:00 (rows 1–2), so persistence added near the ransomware event is not assessable here.
• No registry path/hive context is provided. The dataset does not show which specific key(s) (e.g., HKLM\...\Run, HKCU\...\Run, RunOnce, etc.) these values came from, limiting interpretation and follow-up validation.
• No user attribution. username is empty for both rows (rows 1–2), so it’s not possible to scope to a specific account/profile from this output.
• Only 2 autoruns are shown. This may be incomplete relative to a typical system; cannot determine if other Run/RunOnce values existed and were deleted.
• What to pull next to assess PsExec/persistence/execution:
• Sysmon/Security Event Logs (if available): service creation (PsExec often creates PSEXESVC), process creation.
• Windows Service registry keys / SCM artifacts for PSEXESVC.
• Scheduled Tasks, WMI subscriptions, Startup folders, Winlogon\Userinit/Shell, IFEO, AppInit_DLLs.
• Execution artifacts: Prefetch, Amcache, Shimcache, SRUM, BAM/DAM.
• For ransomware scope: file system timeline around 12 Feb 2024 and any notes/wallpaper changes.

Evidence reviewed (benign autoruns):

• Row 1: SecurityHealth → %windir%\system32\SecurityHealthSystray.exe at 2023-09-24T14:57:27.211781+00:00.
• Row 2: VBoxTray → %SystemRoot%\system32\VBoxTray.exe at 2023-09-24T14:57:27.211781+00:00.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Suspicious scheduled task configured to use PsExec with embedded credentials to execute a payload on multiple remote hosts (likely lateral movement).
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T21:49:21.961830+00:00, task \Enterpries backup run as user admin with run_level=HighestAvailable (row_ref 4). Action shows command=C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe and arguments=-accept-eula \\Desktop-001,Desktop-002,Desktop-003,Desktop-004,Desktop-005,Desktop-006 -c -d -u admin -p letmein -realtime C:\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe (row_ref 5).
• Why it matters: This is strong evidence of automated remote execution to multiple endpoints using a password on the command line, consistent with attacker lateral movement and rapid ransomware propagation.
• Alternative explanation: Could be an (unsafe) admin automation task for software deployment; however the naming (“Enterpries backup”), use of -u admin -p letmein, and executing rename.exe from a user desktop is atypical for legitimate enterprise backups.
• Verify: On the server and targeted desktops, review Task Scheduler Operational log and Security logs for task registration/execution and remote logons around 2024-02-06T21:49:21Z (e.g., TaskScheduler events 106/140/200 and logon events), and collect/inspect C:\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe (hash, signature, compile time, strings).

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Potential privilege escalation/persistence mechanism: task runs with elevated token (“HighestAvailable”) under a non-built-in account (admin).
• Evidence: Task \Enterpries backup shows user_id=admin and run_level=HighestAvailable (row_ref 4), executing PsExec (row_ref 5).
• Why it matters: A scheduled task running elevated under a reusable admin account can provide persistence and facilitate repeated privileged execution.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate admin-created task for maintenance; still risky given credential exposure and PsExec usage.
• Verify: Confirm whether local user admin is expected, when it last logged on, and whether this task exists in the live C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Enterpries backup XML with the same action/user settings.

IOC Status

• psexec → Observed
• Evidence: command=C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe in task \Enterpries backup (row_ref 5), with task timestamp 2024-02-06T21:49:21.961830+00:00 (row_ref 4).
• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: No scheduled task command or arguments contain redpetya.exe in the provided Scheduled Tasks data.

Data Gaps

• Scheduled Tasks definitions here do not include full trigger details (frequency, start time, repetition), task creation/modification metadata beyond the single date field (many tasks have blank date), or execution history; therefore we cannot determine how often/when \Enterpries backup actually ran, only that the definition exists and has a recorded timestamp (rows 4–5).
• This artifact cannot confirm impact or encryption activity (no file/registry/process/network telemetry). To scope and confirm compromise, correlate with:
• Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational.evtx (task registered/updated/launched events),
• Security.evtx (logons, explicit credentials use, service creation if PsExec installed a service),
• Sysmon (if present) for process creation/network connections,
• Prefetch/Amcache/Shimcache for PsExec.exe, rename.exe, and any ransomware-related binaries,
• File system collection for C:\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe and any artifacts on \\Desktop-00x targets.

Nothing suspicious was identified in this Services artifact beyond standard Windows/Defender/Edge/virtualization components; no obvious malicious/persistence-style services (odd names, non-system image paths, or suspicious service DLLs) are present.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: No service imagepath or servicedll entries reference redpetya.exe anywhere in the provided records/time range.
• psexec → Not Observed
• Evidence: No service name/image path references typical PsExec artifacts (e.g., PSEXESVC, psexec.exe) in the provided records/time range.

Data Gaps

• Coverage ends before the ransomware discovery date. This artifact’s time range ends at 2024-02-07T20:59:49.395916Z (e.g., TrustedInstaller, row_ref 463), but the incident was discovered 2024-02-12; any services created/modified between Feb 7–Feb 12 are not captured here.
• Service account/security context not provided. This dataset projection does not include the service “ObjectName” (service account), failure actions, descriptions, ServiceType, StartName, or registry ACLs—fields that often help spot malicious persistence.
• No service creation/change event logs. These records appear to be configuration snapshots (many identical timestamps such as 2023-09-24T14:57:31Z across numerous services), not definitive “service installed at time X” events. This limits conclusions about when services were created/changed.
• PsExec-specific evidence may exist outside Services. PsExec commonly leaves traces in:
• Windows System log (Service Control Manager Event ID 7045 for PSEXESVC)
• Prefetch (PSEXEC*.pf), Amcache/Shimcache, SRUM, EDR telemetry
• Admin$ file writes, C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe (varies)

None of that is available in this artifact.

• Ransomware execution/persistence may not use services. Red Petya-like activity may rely on scheduled tasks, run keys, WMI, startup folders, or dropped drivers/boot modifications—none are represented here.

Recommended next artifacts to review (to confirm scope/entry/lateral movement):
System/Security/Event logs (esp. 7045/4624/4672), Prefetch, Amcache + Shimcache, Scheduled Tasks, Run keys, WMI persistence, $MFT timeline/file system triage for redpetya.exe/related drops, and remote execution traces (SMB/Admin$).

Nothing suspicious can be identified from this WMI Persistence artifact because it contains zero records (no event filters/consumers/bindings to evaluate).

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable (this artifact contains no records/columns to search)
• psexec → Not Assessable (this artifact contains no records/columns to search)

Data Gaps

• No data available: Records: 0, Time range: N/A to N/A, and “No columns available” in the provided CSV, so WMI event filters/consumers/bindings (typical WMI persistence components) cannot be assessed at all from this source.
• Cannot determine presence/absence of WMI persistence: With an empty dataset, we cannot say “not present”—only not assessable.
• Potential collection/parsing issue vs. true absence: This output may indicate (a) the system had no WMI persistence entries, or (b) the WMI repository was not collected, inaccessible/corrupt, or the parser failed. The provided data alone does not distinguish these.

Verify (most useful follow-ups)

• Re-collect/parse WMI persistence from the affected server’s WMI repository (look specifically for EventFilter, CommandLineEventConsumer/ActiveScriptEventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding).
• Corroborate with other persistence artifacts: Scheduled Tasks, Services, Run keys, Startup folders, and Windows Event Logs (especially WMI-Activity Operational log) to cover the same time window around 12 Feb 2024.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Evidence consistent with PsExec lateral movement/service deployment over an admin$ share from host 10.44.24.9.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:25:15.663250+00:00, path \10.44.24.9\admin$\PSEXESVC.exe, row_ref 8.
• Why it matters: PSEXESVC.exe is the PsExec service binary typically copied to admin$ during remote execution, indicating likely remote command execution/lateral movement activity involving 10.44.24.9.
• Alternative explanation: authorized administrative use of PsExec for remote management/maintenance.
• Verify: on both this server and 10.44.24.9, review Service Control Manager events and service artifacts for PSEXESVC (e.g., Windows System log Event IDs 7045/7036) and correlate with Security log logons (4624 type 3) around 2024-02-05T23:25Z.

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Cluster of attacker/admin “post-compromise tooling” staged under C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\ shortly before the PSEXESVC.exe admin$ observation.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:14:39.491949+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe, row_ref 120; 2024-02-05T23:14:40.054529+00:00, ...\Procmon.exe, row_ref 59; 2024-02-05T23:14:38.368250+00:00, ...\procdump.exe, row_ref 70; 2024-02-05T23:14:36.867004+00:00, ...\logonsessions.exe, row_ref 20; plus multiple other Sysinternals binaries at 2024-02-05T23:14:34Z–23:14:40Z (rows 19–81, 119–143).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals tools (notably PsExec/ProcDump/LogonSessions) are commonly used by attackers for remote execution, credential/session discovery, and dumping/triage; timing is close to observed \admin$\PSEXESVC.exe.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate IR/admin troubleshooting using Sysinternals suite.
• Verify: examine C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\ file hashes and timestamps, Prefetch (if enabled) for execution evidence, and Sysmon/EDR telemetry for command lines (especially ProcDump targeting lsass.exe).

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Recon/dual-use network scanning tooling present (Nmap and installer) on the server.
• Evidence: 2022-09-01T22:36:02+00:00, C:\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\nmap.exe, row_ref 98; 2022-09-01T22:36:06+00:00, ...\zenmap.exe, row_ref 100; 2024-02-05T23:41:37.445576+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe, row_ref 115.
• Why it matters: Nmap is frequently used for network discovery and lateral movement planning; its presence/installer download may help scope attacker actions (or indicate admin activity).
• Alternative explanation: legitimate network administration/security scanning.
• Verify: look for process execution evidence (Prefetch, SRUM, Sysmon Event ID 1, PowerShell operational logs) for nmap.exe/zenmap.exe around the incident window.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] Use of certutil.exe is recorded, which is a common “living-off-the-land” tool for downloading/encoding/decoding payloads.
• Evidence: 2023-07-07T21:21:32.208891+00:00, C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\certutil.exe, row_ref 108 (and SysWOW64 variant row_ref 107).
• Why it matters: certutil is frequently abused to fetch or decode malware; however Shimcache does not provide command-line context or prove execution.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate certificate store operations or Windows/IT tasks.
• Verify: pull command-line telemetry from Security (4688 if enabled), Sysmon, or EDR around 2023-07-07T21:21Z, and check for downloaded artifacts in temp/user directories.

IOC Status

• psexec → Observed
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:14:39.491949+00:00 C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe (row_ref 120); 2024-02-05T23:25:15.663250+00:00 \10.44.24.9\admin$\PSEXESVC.exe (row_ref 8); 2024-02-05T23:14:39.522984+00:00 ...\PsExec64.exe (row_ref 122).
• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: no Shimcache entries in provided data contain redpetya.exe in the path field.

Data Gaps

• Shimcache entries do not prove execution and provide no command-line arguments, parent process, user context, remote source user, hashes, or signatures, so intent and exact actions (e.g., whether ProcDump targeted LSASS, whether PsExec executed a payload) are not determinable from this artifact alone.
• The provided Shimcache time range ends at 2024-02-07T10:22:21.783407+00:00, while the ransomware was discovered on 12 Feb 2024; activity between 2024-02-07 and 2024-02-12 is not covered here, limiting direct linkage to the outbreak time.
• \10.44.24.9\admin$\... paths suggest remote activity, but this artifact alone cannot confirm directionality (whether this host accessed 10.44.24.9 or vice versa) or the originating account.
• To confirm compromise and scope, additional artifacts are needed: Windows Event Logs (System/Security), Sysmon/EDR telemetry, Prefetch, Amcache, SRUM, $MFT/USN Journal, Scheduled Tasks/Services registry hives, and remote admin share access logs on relevant hosts (including 10.44.24.9).

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Network reconnaissance tooling (Nmap + Npcap) present, including installer in user Downloads.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-07T21:00:11.233940+00:00 c:\users\admin\downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe publisher=insecure.org product_name=nmap (row_ref 62)
• 2024-02-06T21:01:08.501123+00:00 c:\program files (x86)\nmap\nmap.exe publisher=insecure.org product_name=nmap (row_ref 63)
• 2024-02-06T20:14:15.370394+00:00 c:\program files (x86)\nmap\zenmap.exe version=7.93 product_name=zenmap (row_ref 129)
• 2024-02-06T21:01:08.124117+00:00 c:\program files\npcap\npcap.sys publisher=insecure.com llc. product_name=npcap (row_ref 67)
• Why it matters: Nmap/Npcap are commonly used for internal discovery and targeting during lateral movement and can expand incident scope quickly.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate admin/security scanning or troubleshooting.
• Verify: Check for actual execution/scan activity and targets via Prefetch (e.g., NMAP.EXE, ZENMAP.EXE), Security logs (4688), Sysmon (1/3), and firewall logs around 2024-02-06 to 2024-02-07 UTC.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Presence of Sysinternals Autologon utility in Administrator Downloads (credential-related admin tool).
• Evidence: 2024-02-07T21:00:10.951519+00:00 c:\users\administrator\downloads\sysinternalssuite\autologon64.exe publisher=sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com product_name=sysinternals autologon (row_ref 3)
• Why it matters: Autologon is frequently used to configure or retrieve autologon credentials and could support credential access or persistence if misused.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate use by an administrator for service account convenience.
• Verify: Review registry keys related to autologon (Winlogon values) and check for execution evidence (Prefetch for AUTOLOGON64.EXE, process creation logs).

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Unusual user-space binaries named like built-in commands on the desktop (dir.exe, rename.exe) with missing publisher/product metadata.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-07T21:00:10.342958+00:00 c:\users\admin\desktop\dir.exe publisher= product_name= (row_ref 13)
• 2024-02-07T21:00:10.562542+00:00 c:\users\admin\desktop\rename.exe publisher= product_name= (row_ref 80)
• Why it matters: Adversaries sometimes drop renamed utilities or masquerading binaries in user-writeable paths to evade controls or trick operators/scripts.
• Alternative explanation: Benign custom tools or admin scripts packaged as executables.
• Verify: Acquire hashes and PE metadata for these files from disk, validate signing, and check execution traces (Prefetch/4688/Sysmon). Confirm whether these names appear in PATH or were invoked by scripts.

IOC Status

• psexec → Observed
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T22:14:12.373672+00:00 c:\users\admin\downloads\sysinternalssuite\psexec.exe product_name=sysinternals psexec (row_ref 71)
• 2024-02-06T22:14:14.995445+00:00 c:\users\admin\downloads\sysinternalssuite\psexec64.exe product_name=sysinternals psexec (row_ref 73)
• 2024-02-07T21:00:11.248564+00:00 c:\users\administrator\downloads\sysinternalssuite\psexec64.exe product_name=sysinternals psexec (row_ref 72)

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: No path entries containing redpetya.exe in provided Amcache rows (212 records).

Data Gaps

• Amcache here shows inventory/first-seen-style entries (mtime_regf) but does not prove execution on its own; no command-line, parent process, user context, or remote origin data is present (limits confirming how/if tools were run).
• The dataset ends at 2024-02-09T21:00:06.885025+00:00, but the ransomware impact was discovered 2024-02-12; activity on/after Feb 10–12 is not covered by this artifact extract/time range.
• No hashes are provided in the projected columns, so tool/binary integrity (tampering/masquerade) can’t be validated from this output alone.
• To assess compromise behaviors (lateral movement, credential theft, persistence, log tampering), you’d need: Security Event Logs (4624/4625/4688/7045/1102), Sysmon, Prefetch, SRUM, Scheduled Tasks, Services registry, Run keys, Shimcache, Jump Lists/LNK access times, and PsExec-specific traces (e.g., PSEXESVC service creation events).

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] PsExec executed from an admin user’s Downloads directory (lateral movement / remote execution risk).
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T22:14:12.975912+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec64.exe (row_ref 13)
• 2024-02-09T22:55:44.556122+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe (row_ref 23)
• Why it matters: PsExec is commonly used by ransomware operators for remote service execution and payload staging across hosts.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate sysadmin remote administration using Sysinternals.
• Verify: collect and review Windows Event Logs for service creation/installation consistent with PsExec (e.g., System log service install events and Security process creation) around 2024-02-06T22:14Z and 2024-02-09T22:55Z, and check for the presence of PSEXESVC artifacts on disk/registry.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Nmap tooling present/executed (host discovery / internal recon capability).
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-05T23:43:02.682171+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe (row_ref 15)
• 2024-02-05T23:42:44.420574+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files\Npcap\NPFInstall.exe (row_ref 16)
• 2024-02-08T19:06:34.806301+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\zenmap.exe (row_ref 17)
• Why it matters: Nmap/Npcap/Zenmap usage can indicate network reconnaissance that supports lateral movement and targeting.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate network troubleshooting/assessment by IT.
• Verify: check for Nmap scan evidence (e.g., command-line history, Nmap output files, Zenmap profiles) and correlate with firewall/proxy/network telemetry around 2024-02-05T23:42Z and 2024-02-08T19:06Z.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] RDP client executed (possible interactive lateral movement).
• Evidence: 2024-02-08T19:03:33.683090+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe (row_ref 28)
• Why it matters: RDP is frequently used for hands-on-keyboard activity during ransomware deployment.
• Alternative explanation: normal administrative RDP usage.
• Verify: review RDP-related artifacts/logs (TerminalServices-* event logs, Security log logon type 10, Default.rdp, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client) for destination hosts and usernames around 2024-02-08T19:03Z.

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] rundll32.exe executed (common LOLBin; could be benign or abuse depending on arguments—not available here).
• Evidence: 2024-02-09T20:59:30.651415+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe (row_ref 18)
• Why it matters: rundll32.exe is a common “living off the land” binary used to run malicious DLL exports or scriptlets; BAM does not capture command-line to confirm.
• Alternative explanation: routine Windows/application activity invoking Control Panel applets or legitimate DLL exports.
• Verify: obtain process creation telemetry with command line (Security 4688 / Sysmon Event ID 1) for rundll32.exe around 2024-02-09T20:59Z.

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] msdt.exe executed (living-off-the-land potential; context unknown).
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:21:39.094095+00:00, \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\msdt.exe (row_ref 14)
• Why it matters: msdt.exe has been abused for code execution in past attack chains; BAM lacks command line/parent process to confirm intent.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate troubleshooting wizard launch.
• Verify: check process creation logs for msdt.exe command-line/parent around 2024-02-05T23:21Z and inspect related diagnostic package invocations.

IOC Status

• psexec → Observed
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T22:14:12.975912+00:00 PsExec64.exe (row_ref 13)
• 2024-02-09T22:55:44.556122+00:00 PsExec.exe (row_ref 23)
• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: No path entries in this BAM/DAM dataset match redpetya.exe (all 32 records listed; none contain that filename).

Data Gaps

• BAM/DAM here includes only ts and path; it does not include user SID, hostname/remote target, parent process, command line, hashes, or execution outcome. This limits attribution (which account), intent (what arguments were used), and whether tools were used maliciously vs legitimately.
• Time range ends 2024-02-09T22:55:44.556122+00:00, but the incident was discovered 2024-02-12; activity on/near 12 Feb is not covered by this artifact export.
• Deduplication removed many near-duplicate rows (noted in _dedup_comment), which may obscure frequency/repetition patterns of execution.
• To scope compromise: correlate with Security/System event logs (process creation, logons, service installs), Sysmon (if present), Prefetch, Amcache/Shimcache, SRUM, Scheduled Tasks, Services registry keys, and any EDR/network telemetry for the same timeframe.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] GUI execution of Sysinternals PsExec (commonly used for lateral movement/remote execution) by user admin.
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T22:14:10.115000+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec.exe, executions=1, username=admin (row_ref 27); 2024-02-06T22:14:12.356998+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite\PsExec64.exe, executions=1, username=admin (row_ref 14).
• Why it matters: PsExec use is a frequent technique for remote code execution and ransomware propagation across systems.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate administrative use of Sysinternals tools by an IT admin.
• Verify: correlate with Windows Security log for service install/remote execution evidence (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 1/7 if present; Security 4688 process creation; Service creation events) around 2024-02-06 22:14 UTC, and check for PSEXESVC.exe artifacts.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Execution of Sysinternals psshutdown64.exe from a Temp extraction path (suggesting it was run directly from a ZIP/unpacked temp folder).
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:14:20.084999+00:00, C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\3\Temp1_SysinternalsSuite.zip\psshutdown64.exe, executions=1, username=admin (row_ref 12).
• Why it matters: remote shutdown/reboot tooling can be used to disrupt services or force reboots during ransomware deployment; running from Temp is consistent with ad-hoc operator activity.
• Alternative explanation: benign troubleshooting (e.g., scripted maintenance) where an admin ran Sysinternals tools without installing them.
• Verify: check System event logs for shutdown/restart events and initiating process/user around 2024-02-05 23:14 UTC (e.g., Event IDs 1074/6006/6008), and review prefetch/Amcache for the binary’s execution details.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Use of Nmap Zenmap GUI by admin shortly before PsExec activity (potential internal reconnaissance).
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T21:09:13.195999+00:00, {7C5A40EF-A0FB-4BFC-874A-C0F2E0B9FA8E}\Nmap\zenmap.exe, executions=2, username=admin (row_ref 19); plus shortcut execution 2024-02-06T21:09:13.195999+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Desktop\Nmap - Zenmap GUI.lnk, executions=1 (row_ref 44) and 2024-02-05T23:43:16.150000+00:00, {A77F5D77-2E2B-44C3-A6A2-ABA601054A51}\Nmap\Nmap - Zenmap GUI.lnk, executions=1 (row_ref 41).
• Why it matters: network scanning is commonly part of attacker discovery prior to lateral movement/ransomware spread.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate network/admin troubleshooting or inventory scanning.
• Verify: review firewall logs/packet capture logs (if any) and Nmap output/history files on disk (e.g., in user profile) to determine scan targets and timing.

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Indicators of interactive admin activity on/around 9 Feb including AD management and Task Scheduler access (could be benign administration or attacker staging).
• Evidence: 2024-02-09T19:48:28.288000+00:00, dsa.msc executions=5, username=admin (row_ref 6) and corresponding shortcut Active Directory Users and Computers.lnk executions=5 (row_ref 37); 2024-02-09T22:52:31.673000+00:00, Task Scheduler.lnk executions=3, username=admin (row_ref 47); 2024-02-09T22:53:05.400000+00:00, cmd.exe executions=7, username=admin (row_ref 13).
• Why it matters: AD and scheduled tasks are common places for attackers to create persistence and deploy payloads, but this artifact does not show what actions were taken inside those tools.
• Alternative explanation: routine domain administration/troubleshooting by admin.
• Verify: inspect Scheduled Tasks (TaskCache registry + C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\) and AD change/audit logs for modifications around 2024-02-09 19:48–22:53 UTC.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no matching path/value present in provided UserAssist rows).
• psexec → Observed
• Evidence: PsExec.exe at 2024-02-06T22:14:10.115000+00:00 (row_ref 27); PsExec64.exe at 2024-02-06T22:14:12.356998+00:00 (row_ref 14).

Data Gaps

• UserAssist only records Explorer/GUI-launched executions; it is not reliable for service/remote execution (e.g., PsExec running remotely, scheduled tasks, services, WMI, or command-line-only launches may not appear). This limits conclusions about ransomware execution and propagation.
• Many entries have timestamp 1601-01-01T00:00:00+00:00 with executions 0 (multiple rows), indicating missing/invalid “last run” times for those items; this prevents building a complete timeline from this artifact alone.
• No command-line arguments, parent process, remote host info, hashes, or file metadata are present in this dataset—so intent (benign admin vs attacker) and scope cannot be confirmed here.
• The dataset ends at 2024-02-09T22:53:05.400000+00:00, while the incident was discovered 2024-02-12; activity between Feb 9 and Feb 12 is not visible in this artifact.
• To confirm compromise and scope, the most useful next artifacts would be: Security/System/Application event logs (and Sysmon if deployed), Prefetch (PsExec/Nmap/cmd/psshutdown), Amcache/Shimcache, SRUM, scheduled tasks (TaskCache + Tasks folder), services registry, RDP logs, and any PsExec service artifacts (PSEXESVC).

Findings

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Sysinternals Suite ZIP was deleted from the admin user’s Downloads, which may indicate removal of tooling consistent with PsExec-related activity (PsExec is part of Sysinternals).
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:14:49.615999+00:00, path C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite.zip, user admin, size 50.6 MB, row_ref 2.
• Why it matters: Deleting Sysinternals tooling after use can be consistent with post-activity cleanup and could align with suspected lateral movement/execution via PsExec.
• Alternative explanation: Admin may have legitimately downloaded and then deleted SysinternalsSuite.zip during routine administration.
• Verify: Check file execution artifacts for Sysinternals tools around this time (e.g., Prefetch for PsExec*.exe, Amcache/Shimcache, Sysmon EID 1 if present) and look for psexec service artifacts (PSEXESVC) in System logs.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: LOW] A large archive named share.zip (0.65 GB) was deleted from the admin user’s Desktop, which may indicate data staging/exfiltration or cleanup.
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T22:14:44.067999+00:00, path C:\Users\admin\Desktop\share.zip, user admin, size 0.65 GB, row_ref 1.
• Why it matters: Large ZIP archives on Desktop are commonly used to stage data for transfer; deletion may indicate attempted concealment of such activity.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate packaging/sharing of files followed by deletion to free space.
• Verify: Correlate with network transfer evidence (proxy/firewall logs, SMB/RDP session logs) and examine $Recycle.Bin metadata / USN Journal / MFT entries (if available) to determine original filename timestamps and whether it was moved/copied elsewhere before deletion.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no matching filename/path in the provided Recycle Bin records)
• psexec → Not Observed (no explicit psexec file/service name present in these Recycle Bin records; only a deleted Sysinternals suite archive that could contain it)

Data Gaps

• This artifact only shows two deleted items from admin between 2024-02-05T23:14:49.615999+00:00 and 2024-02-06T22:14:44.067999+00:00; it does not cover the incident discovery date (12 Feb 2024), so activity closer to the ransomware event is not assessable here.
• Recycle Bin metadata alone does not show what executed, who created the files, hashes, file contents, original creation/modification times, or whether items were securely wiped—so malicious execution, persistence, credential access, and lateral movement are largely not assessable from this data.
• Additional artifacts needed to confirm/deny compromise: Windows Event Logs (System/Security, including service creation and logons), Sysmon (if present), Prefetch, Amcache/Shimcache, MFT/USN Journal, PowerShell logs, RDP logs, and any EDR telemetry.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: CRITICAL] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] FTP access to a public IP, including a path that appears to reference an internal domain name (“branchoffice.example.com”), which may indicate data staging/exfiltration or external file transfer activity.
• Evidence: 2024-02-07T16:57:05.940533+00:00 ftp://185.239.106.67/ visit_count=2 user=admin (row_ref 51); 2024-02-07T16:57:31.964310+00:00 ftp://185.239.106.67/branchoffice.example.com/ visit_count=9 user=admin (row_ref 50).
• Why it matters: FTP to an external IP is a common channel for exfiltration and malware operator tooling, and the directory name suggests targeting or organizing data by internal environment.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate administrative FTP transfer to a third-party host (still unusual without documented business need).
• Verify: Correlate with firewall/proxy logs and Windows event logs for outbound connections to 185.239.106.67 around 2024-02-07T16:57Z, and inspect any local FTP client artifacts/credentials and files transferred (e.g., recent files, $MFT, Prefetch, WebCacheV01.dat, and any FTP client configuration files).

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Ransomware-note-like file opened: RyukReadMe.txt on the admin desktop, strongly suggestive of Ryuk ransomware presence or a copied ransom note.
• Evidence: 2024-02-06T20:53:29.889280+00:00 file:///C:/Users/admin/Desktop/RyukReadMe.txt user=admin (row_ref 48).
• Why it matters: A “RyukReadMe” file name closely matches ransomware note naming conventions and may indicate ransomware execution or lateral movement activity near the incident window.
• Alternative explanation: A security/admin user saved a sample note for training/IR reference (less likely on a server desktop).
• Verify: Acquire and hash C:\Users\admin\Desktop\RyukReadMe.txt, look for ransomware execution artifacts (Prefetch for common droppers/encryptors, SRUM, Amcache/Shimcache, Scheduled Tasks, Services, and relevant event logs).

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Download activity for network scanning tool Nmap via Softonic (adware-prone distribution channel), which may indicate reconnaissance tooling acquisition.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:40:22.322380+00:00 Bing search download nmap (row_ref 12); navigation to Softonic Nmap pages including https://nmap.en.softonic.com/download at 2024-02-05T23:41:09.940691+00:00 (rowref 18) and related Softonic URLs (rowrefs 17, 19, 20), user=admin.
• Why it matters: Nmap is commonly used for internal discovery/scanning; obtaining it from Softonic increases risk of bundled/unwanted software and may align with attacker reconnaissance.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate admin downloading Nmap for troubleshooting/auditing.
• Verify: Check for nmap.exe presence and execution (Prefetch, Amcache, Shimcache), and review EDR/process telemetry for scans and command lines around 2024-02-05T23:40Z.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Sysinternals Suite was downloaded/opened (often includes PsExec and other dual-use tools), consistent with remote administration or attacker tooling preparation.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:13:17.260740+00:00 Bing search download sysinternals suite (row_ref 8); 2024-02-05T23:13:27.154423+00:00 visit to Microsoft Learn Sysinternals Suite page (row_ref 11); 2024-02-05T23:13:45.314323+00:00 local file opened file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/SysinternalsSuite.zip (row_ref 43), user=admin. Similar prior activity exists for Administrator on 2023-11-04 and local open SysinternalsSuite.zip on 2023-11-04T15:26:31.564228+00:00 (row_ref 57).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals contains multiple post-exploitation-capable utilities; in a ransomware context it can support lateral movement and execution (including PsExec), though this artifact alone doesn’t prove PsExec use.
• Alternative explanation: Routine admin tooling download for legitimate system troubleshooting.
• Verify: Inspect extracted contents and execution traces specifically for PsExec.exe (file system, Prefetch PSEXEC*.pf, Amcache, Shimcache) and review Windows Security logs for service creation/remote service installs typical of PsExec.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Potential credential access/sensitive data handling: a file named account_password.xlsx opened from a share path.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:09:16.723713+00:00 file:///C:/share/Clark.Nicholson/Documents/account_password.xlsx user=admin (row_ref 46).
• Why it matters: Password spreadsheets are HIGH-risk and frequently targeted/abused during compromise for credential harvesting and lateral movement.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate administrative credential tracking (still risky).
• Verify: Locate and review access history/ACLs for the file share and check for unusual reads/copies (SMB logs, file server logs, $MFT/USN Journal if available, and auditing on the share).

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no URL/title/path contains redpetya.exe in the provided browser history rows).
• psexec → Not Observed (no explicit browser history entries referencing “psexec”; note Sysinternals download may include it but that is not proof of use from this artifact alone—see Findings/evidence above).

Data Gaps

• The browser history ends at 2024-02-07T16:57:31.964310+00:00, but the incident was discovered 2024-02-12; activity between Feb 7–Feb 12 is not present here, so compromise actions closer to discovery are not assessable from this artifact.
• Browser history does not show actual file download completion, file contents, process execution, command lines, or network transfer details; therefore execution of Nmap/Sysinternals/PsExec and any ransomware binary execution is not determinable from this data alone.
• No referrer/from_url is present for several entries (blank from_url), limiting reconstruction of user navigation paths.
• This artifact cannot confirm privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement techniques (needs Windows Event Logs, Prefetch, Amcache/Shimcache, Scheduled Tasks/Services, registry run keys, SRUM, and EDR telemetry).

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Nmap installer downloaded by an admin account from a third-party “Softonic” CDN shortly before the Feb 12 ransomware discovery window.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:41:28.640888+00:00 → 2024-02-05T23:41:37.446659+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe, URL https://gsf-fl.softonic.com/.../nmap-7.93-setup.exe?...&url=https://nmap.en.softonic.com&Filename=nmap-7.93-setup.exe, state complete, user admin (row_ref 2).
• Why it matters: Nmap is a common network discovery tool that can support attacker reconnaissance/lateral movement, and third-party download portals increase tampering/supply-chain risk compared to vendor sources.
• Alternative explanation: A legitimate administrator may have been performing sanctioned network scanning/troubleshooting and used a convenient download mirror.
• Verify: Check execution evidence for nmap-7.93-setup.exe (Prefetch, Amcache, Shimcache, SRUM/AppCompat) and correlate with process/network activity around 2024-02-05 23:41 UTC.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Sysinternals Suite downloaded multiple times by privileged users, which may include tools commonly abused for credential access and remote execution.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-05T23:13:32.211950+00:00 → 2024-02-05T23:13:41.429815+00:00, C:\Users\admin\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite.zip, URL https://download.sysinternals.com/files/SysinternalsSuite.zip, state complete, user admin (row_ref 1).
• 2023-11-04T15:25:24.686308+00:00 → 2023-11-04T15:26:13.780079+00:00, C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite.zip, same URL, state complete, user Administrator (row_ref 3).
• 2023-11-04T15:25:50.105404+00:00, C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\SysinternalsSuite (1).zip, same URL, state cancelled (row_ref 4).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals contains tools that are frequently used post-compromise (e.g., process/service utilities); repeated downloads by admin-context accounts can support staging of tooling for malicious activity, especially near incident timelines.
• Alternative explanation: Sysinternals Suite is also a standard legitimate admin toolkit for troubleshooting.
• Verify: Determine whether Sysinternals tools were extracted/executed (look for procexp*.exe, psexec*.exe, autoruns*.exe, etc.) via Prefetch/Amcache/Shimcache, and check for corresponding Windows Event Logs (Process Creation 4688/Sysmon 1 if available).

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no download record for this filename/path/URL in the provided Browser Downloads rows).
• psexec → Not Assessable (this artifact only shows downloads; it does not show execution, and no explicit psexec filename appears in the download paths/URLs—SysinternalsSuite may contain PsExec, but inclusion/extraction/execution is not shown here).

Data Gaps

• This artifact only covers browser download events (4 records) from 2023-11-04T15:25:24.686308+00:00 to 2024-02-05T23:41:28.640888+00:00; it does not include the incident date (2024-02-12) and cannot confirm what happened on/after that date from downloads alone.
• No evidence here of execution, persistence, privilege escalation, credential access, lateral movement, or exfiltration—those require other artifacts (e.g., Security/System logs, Sysmon, Prefetch, Amcache/Shimcache, Scheduled Tasks, Services, WMI, Run keys, firewall logs, RDP logs).
• No hash/signature/certificate data for downloaded files is provided, so file integrity and provenance cannot be verified from this dataset.
• No indication of tampering/log clearing can be concluded from these four rows alone; we lack broader browser history/database context (e.g., full Edge History/Downloads DB, profile timestamps) to assess completeness.

Nothing suspicious can be identified from this artifact because there are zero Activities Cache (Windows Timeline) records in the provided data.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable (no records/columns provided in Activities Cache export)
• psexec → Not Assessable (no records/columns provided in Activities Cache export)

Data Gaps

• No usable dataset: The artifact shows Records: 0 with Time range: N/A to N/A and “No columns available.” This means there is no Timeline activity evidence to confirm/deny any program execution, document/URL access, or user interaction around 12 Feb 2024.
• Cannot assess DFIR behaviors from this artifact: With no entries, this artifact cannot support checks for:
• Malicious program execution (e.g., ransomware launch, tools run)
• Privilege escalation / credential access (no app/activity traces)
• Persistence / evasion / lateral movement / exfiltration (no URLs/apps/doc interactions)
• Possible reasons (cannot be concluded from provided data): Timeline may be disabled, not collected on servers, the database may be missing/corrupt, or the collection/export failed. There is insufficient data to call this tampering.
• Recommended follow-up artifacts (to answer your incident questions):
• Windows Event Logs: Security (4624/4625/4688), System, Application; PowerShell (4104), WMI, TaskScheduler logs.
• Sysmon (if present): process creation, network connections, file create.
• Service/install & remote exec evidence: Service Control Manager events (7045), PsExec service artifacts (e.g., PSEXESVC), ADMIN$ file drops.
• Prefetch / Amcache / Shimcache / SRUM (where applicable) for execution traces of redpetya.exe, psexec.exe, or renamed equivalents.
• File system triage: locate redpetya.exe, hash, compile time (if available), C:\Windows\Temp, C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp, C:\Windows\System32\ recent writes.
• Remote access: RDP logs (TerminalServices-*), firewall logs, SMB logs, and lateral movement indicators.

Nothing suspicious can be identified from this SRUM Network Data artifact because it contains 0 records (no timestamps, no applications, no network usage entries).

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable (no SRUM network rows to correlate with any executable)
• psexec → Not Assessable (no SRUM network rows to identify PsExec service/binary activity or related network usage)

Data Gaps

• No telemetry available: The artifact explicitly reports Records: 0 and Time range: N/A to N/A, and the CSV shows “No columns available.” This prevents validating any network activity, per-application bandwidth usage, lateral movement patterns, or unusual outbound connections around 12 Feb 2024.
• Cannot assess DFIR network-related behaviors: With no SRUM rows, this artifact cannot support or refute indicators of:
• lateral movement / remote execution (e.g., PsExec-driven SMB/RPC patterns at the app level),
• exfiltration (HIGH outbound usage),
• malware execution “by application” (which process generated traffic),
• or evasion (e.g., sudden cessation of expected network usage).
• Possible reasons (cannot be concluded from provided data): SRUM may be missing/not collected, SRUDB.dat may not have been acquired/parsed, the dataset may have filtered out all rows, or the database could be damaged—however, there is no evidence here to claim tampering/clearing.
• What would help next (specific follow-ups):
• Acquire/parse SRUDB.dat and related SRUM tables directly (confirm the file exists and is readable).
• Correlate with other network-capable artifacts: Windows Security/System logs (4688/7045/5140/4624), Sysmon (if present), Firewall logs, NetFlow/proxy/DNS logs, Amcache/Shimcache, Prefetch, and $MFT to scope execution and movement around the incident window.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Nmap was installed and used from the interactive “admin” profile (network scanning / discovery capability).
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T00:06:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Downloads\nmap-7.93-setup.exe user S-1-5-21-1057484085-1795310446-2370380301-2611 foregroundcycletime 37987545588 (row_ref 66925)
• 2024-02-06T00:06:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\zenmap.exe user ...-2611 foregroundcycletime 227183733421 (row_ref 66926)
• 2024-02-06T00:06:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Program Files (x86)\Nmap\nmap.exe user ...-2611 foregroundcycletime 221269249429 (row_ref 66927)
• Why it matters: Nmap/Zenmap are commonly used for internal reconnaissance and can indicate an attacker enumerating the network prior to lateral movement/ransomware deployment.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate admin/security team scanning activity or sanctioned troubleshooting.
• Verify: Confirm whether Nmap installation and scans were approved by checking software deployment/change records and correlate with command-line evidence (e.g., Prefetch for nmap.exe, PowerShell history, SRUM Network Connectivity, firewall logs).

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Interactive remote access via RDP is indicated shortly before the end of available SRUM data.
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-08T20:00:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe user S-1-5-21-1057484085-1795310446-2370380301-2611 foregroundcycletime 2907504339 (row_ref 72016)
• 2024-02-06T00:06:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\rdpclip.exe user ...-2611 foregroundcycletime 12051315832 (row_ref 66907)
• Why it matters: RDP is a common entry/lateral-movement vector in ransomware incidents; this helps scope interactive activity tied to the ...-2611 account.
• Alternative explanation: Normal administrative remote management.
• Verify: Correlate with Security event logs for logon types (4624 type 10), RDP session logs (TerminalServices-*), and identify the source IP/host.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] “rename.exe” executed from the admin desktop (unusual location/name; may indicate staging/utility use).
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-09T22:56:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe user S-1-5-21-1057484085-1795310446-2370380301-2611 foregroundcycletime 13284139184 (row_ref 73965)
• Why it matters: Executables run from user Desktop paths are frequently attacker-staged tools; “rename.exe” could be used for batch renaming (including ransomware-related file operations), but SRUM alone cannot confirm intent.
• Alternative explanation: Legitimate admin utility placed on Desktop.
• Verify: Acquire/hash C:\Users\admin\Desktop\rename.exe, inspect file metadata/signature, and correlate with file rename activity (USN Journal, $MFT, ransomware note extensions) around the same timeframe.

• [SEVERITY: LOW] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Indicators of system configuration/maintenance activity under the ...-2611 user (could also align with attacker “living off the land”).
• Evidence:
• 2024-02-06T22:25:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\msconfig.exe user ...-2611 foregroundcycletime 907622122 (row_ref 68717)
• 2024-02-06T21:24:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe user ...-2611 foregroundcycletime 2519540870 (row_ref 68619)
• 2023-12-13T10:14:00+00:00 \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\sc.exe user S-1-5-18 foregroundcycletime 112479860 (row_ref 795)
• Why it matters: Attackers sometimes use built-in tools to disable services, remove traces, or change boot/configuration settings; these entries may help focus log review.
• Alternative explanation: Routine administration/troubleshooting.
• Verify: Review System/Security logs for service changes (7045/7036), registry changes, and any evidence of log deletion/cleanup around 2024-02-06 to 2024-02-09.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no app value matching redpetya.exe in provided SRUM rows)
• psexec → Not Observed (no psexec.exe, PsExec, or typical service name hints are present in app values in provided SRUM rows)

Data Gaps

• SRUM Application data ends at 2024-02-09T22:56:00+00:00 (recorded range: 2023-12-11T22:56:00+00:00 to 2024-02-09T22:56:00+00:00). The ransomware was discovered 2024-02-12, so this artifact does not cover the suspected execution window; activity on/after 2024-02-10 is missing from this dataset.
• This SRUM projection lacks key execution context fields (e.g., process command line, parent process, hashes, network destinations, full user names). Therefore, privilege escalation, credential access (e.g., Mimikatz), PsExec-style lateral movement, and exfiltration are largely Not Assessable from this artifact alone.
• Heavy deduplication is reported (e.g., “Rows removed…: 73734” and many “Deduplicated … records…” comments). While not proof of tampering, it reduces granularity and may hide short-lived/rare process executions.
• Recommended corroborating artifacts: Security/System/Application EVTX (4624/4688/7045/etc.), Prefetch (PSEXEC*, NMAP*, RENAME*), Amcache/Shimcache, USN Journal, SRUM Network Connectivity, RDP logs (TerminalServices-*), and file acquisition for rename.exe and any Nmap outputs/scripts.

Findings

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: HIGH] Sysinternals Suite (often includes PsExec) was browsed from removable media shortly before the ransomware discovery window.
• Evidence: 2024-02-05T23:13:42+00:00 path My Computer\{088e3905-0323-4b02-9826-5d99428e115f}\SysinternalsSuite.zip username admin (row_ref 60); 2024-02-05T23:14:42+00:00 path My Computer\{088e3905-0323-4b02-9826-5d99428e115f}\SysinternalsSuite username admin (row_ref 61). Also 2023-11-04T15:33:16+00:00 path My Computer\{088e3905-0323-4b02-9826-5d99428e115f}\SysinternalsSuite username Administrator (row_ref 203).
• Why it matters: Sysinternals is a common vehicle for admin tools and attacker “living-off-the-land” activity; its presence in the lead-up may support staging for remote execution/lateral movement.
• Alternative explanation: legitimate admin troubleshooting toolkit on a USB/removable volume.
• Verify: on the affected server, check for psexec.exe/psexesvc.exe and related artifacts (Prefetch, Amcache/Shimcache, Service Control Manager/System event logs for service install/start, and ADMIN$ writes).

• [SEVERITY: HIGH] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] Evidence of administrative-share browsing to multiple internal hosts (C$ / ADMIN$), consistent with lateral movement reconnaissance or remote administration.
• Evidence: 2024-02-08T08:16:56+00:00 \\10.44.24.6\c$\Users user admin (row_ref 22); 2024-02-08T08:22:12+00:00 \\10.44.24.1\c$\Users user admin (row_ref 17); 2024-02-08T08:29:48+00:00 \\10.44.24.7\c$\Users user admin (row_ref 27); 2024-02-08T08:33:14+00:00 \\10.44.24.9\c$\Users user admin (row_ref 32); 2024-02-08T08:39:20+00:00 \\10.44.24.8\c$\Users user admin (row_ref 4). Presence of \\10.44.24.9\admin$ (row_ref 35; timestamp not populated in this record).
• Why it matters: repeated access to C$/ADMIN$ across several systems is commonly associated with remote execution frameworks (including PsExec) and ransomware propagation.
• Alternative explanation: routine systems administration across endpoints/servers.
• Verify: correlate with Security logon events (e.g., 4624 type 3), SMB share access (5140/5145), and remote service creation (7045 in System log) on both the source system and the referenced hosts around 2024-02-08T08:16–08:39 UTC.

• [SEVERITY: MEDIUM] [CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM] A potentially staged archive (“important.zip”) was browsed on the Desktop shortly before incident discovery.
• Evidence: 2024-02-07T04:04:00+00:00 path My Computer\Desktop\important.zip username admin (row_ref 63).
• Why it matters: archives on Desktop with generic names may indicate staging of tools/data (exfiltration packaging or malware delivery), especially near an incident window.
• Alternative explanation: benign user/admin-created archive.
• Verify: locate and hash C:\Users\<profile>\Desktop\important.zip, review contents and origin (Zone.Identifier ADS, file creation/modify times, AV/EDR detections).

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed (no shellbag path contains redpetya.exe).
• psexec → Not Observed (string/tool name not present in shellbag paths); however, SysinternalsSuite (which may contain PsExec) Observed as above (rows 60, 61, 203).

Data Gaps

• Shellbags show folders viewed, not execution: this artifact cannot prove psexec (or any tool) was run, only that certain paths were browsed.
• ts_atime and ts_btime are empty for all records (per stats), limiting timeline fidelity and preventing confirmation of first-seen vs last-modified shell item times.
• Several network share records have no timestamp populated (e.g., \\10.44.24.9\admin$ row_ref 35), so sequencing is incomplete.
• The dataset time range includes clearly unrealistic endpoints (e.g., up to year 2071 in the header), which may indicate parsing/clock issues in source hive(s); this prevents strong conclusions about absolute chronology beyond the specific populated timestamps shown.
• No direct visibility here into credential access, persistence, or ransomware execution. To confirm compromise scope and method, you’d need: Windows Event Logs (Security/System), Prefetch, Amcache/Shimcache, SRUM, Scheduled Tasks, Services registry keys, C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\*, and SMB/Firewall logs on the involved hosts (10.44.24.1/.6/.7/.8/.9).

Nothing suspicious was identified in this MUIcache dataset beyond normal Windows/Server administration components; however, this artifact cannot reliably confirm or refute ransomware execution or PsExec use due to missing timestamps and limited coverage of non-shell execution.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Observed
• Evidence: No path entries containing redpetya.exe in the provided CSV (596 rows).
• psexec → Not Observed
• Evidence: No path entries containing psexec, psexec.exe, psexesvc, or PAExec in the provided CSV (596 rows).

Data Gaps

• No timestamps available: The dataset has no per-record timestamp field and the stated Time range: N/A to N/A, so MUIcache entries cannot be correlated to the suspected incident date (12 Feb 2024) or sequenced into a timeline.
• MUIcache scope limitation (execution visibility): MUIcache primarily records programs launched via the Windows shell/UI. If ransomware or PsExec was executed as a service, scheduled task, remote service, WMI, or other non-shell mechanism, it may not appear here (insufficient data from this artifact alone).
• No direct evidence of common admin-abuse tools: While entries show administrative tools (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe row_ref 39-40, C:\Windows\regedit.exe row_ref 41-42, C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe row_ref 3-4, and various RSAT/AD tools like dsadmin.dll row_ref 225, 584-587), MUIcache does not include command lines, scripts, modules used, remote targets, or user intent—so credential access, lateral movement, and persistence cannot be assessed here.
• What to collect next to scope compromise (artifacts that would answer your PsExec/ransomware questions):
• Windows Event Logs: Security (4624/4688), System (service install/start), Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon (if present), and Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices/RemoteConnectionManager.
• Prefetch (PSEXEC*.pf, PAEXEC*.pf, powershell*.pf, suspicious binaries), if enabled.
• Amcache.hve and Shimcache/AppCompatCache for executed binaries (often better execution residue than MUIcache).
• Services / Scheduled Tasks: SCM database, C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\, and Task Scheduler operational log.
• Registry Run keys / WMI persistence: relevant registry hives and WMI repository.
• File system triage around suspected payload locations (including the other server where redpetya.exe was found): $MFT, USN Journal, and ransomware note artifacts (extensions, dropped files).

Nothing suspicious detected in this SAM Users data: it only shows default built-in local accounts and no evidence of unauthorized account creation or privilege abuse.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable (this artifact contains only local user account metadata; no file execution/presence data)
• psexec → Not Assessable (this artifact contains only local user account metadata; no service/process/event log data)

Data Gaps

• No visibility into Feb 12, 2024 activity. This artifact’s timestamps are limited to 2023-09-24T14:58:02.494949Z to 2023-09-24T14:58:04.128811Z (rows 1–4), so it cannot confirm or refute actions around the ransomware date.
• No non-default accounts present. Only built-in accounts are listed:
• Administrator (RID 500) row 1 @ 2023-09-24T14:58:02.494949Z
• Guest (RID 501) row 2 @ 2023-09-24T14:58:02.494949Z
• DefaultAccount (RID 503) row 3 @ 2023-09-24T14:58:02.494949Z
• WDAGUtilityAccount (RID 504) row 4 @ 2023-09-24T14:58:04.128811Z
• Account activity fields are unusable here. lastlogin, lastpasswordset, and lastincorrectlogin are all 1601-01-01T00:00:00Z for every account (rows 1–4), so this dataset cannot be used to determine whether these accounts were used or modified.
• Cannot assess typical compromise behaviors (persistence via new users, enabling Guest/Administrator, password resets) without additional artifacts such as:
• Windows Security Event Log (e.g., 4720/4722/4723/4724/4728/4732/4738), System log (service creation), and PowerShell logs
• SAM + SECURITY hive correlation (for local group membership), and/or net localgroup/LSA policy artifacts
• Evidence of PsExec (service PSEXESVC, Prefetch, SCM event logs) and execution traces (Prefetch, Shimcache, Amcache, SRUM)

Nothing suspicious can be identified from this artifact because it contains zero Defender Quarantine records.

IOC Status

• redpetya.exe → Not Assessable (no quarantine rows/columns present; Records: 0).
• PsExec (psexec) → Not Assessable (no quarantine rows/columns present; Records: 0).

Data Gaps

• No events to analyze: The artifact reports Records: 0 and Time range: N/A to N/A, so there is no evidence here of quarantined malware, tool staging, or Defender detections related to ransomware, PsExec, credential access, persistence, or lateral movement.
• Missing fields/structure: “No columns available” prevents validation of expected quarantine metadata (e.g., original file path, threat name, action taken, user context, detection time).
• Cannot distinguish “no detections” vs. “missing artifact”: With empty output, it’s unclear whether Defender truly quarantined nothing, quarantine history was cleared, Defender was disabled/misconfigured, or collection failed.

Verify (next best artifacts)

• Collect Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational event log (and any Defender ATP/EDR telemetry) to confirm detections, configuration changes, and tamper events.
• For suspected PsExec/lateral movement: review Security.evtx (4624/4625/4672/4688), Sysmon (if present), Service Control Manager logs (PSEXESVC creation), and Prefetch/Amcache/Shimcache for execution evidence.
• For ransomware scope: check $MFT/USN Journal, SRUM, Scheduled Tasks, Run keys, and remote execution traces (WMI/WinRM/RDP) on the affected server(s).